Technology Governance Wiki - Recent changes [en]

Data: Data Portability

Plixavra — Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:21:54 GMT

United States

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Data:China

Plixavra — Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:20:39 GMT

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Data:China

Plixavra — Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:19:18 GMT

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Data: Data Portability

Plixavra — Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:19:09 GMT

China

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	According to [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng#art_20 Article 20] of the General Data Protection Regulation, "[the data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided" where processing is based on consent or contract and is carried out by automated means. Additionally, the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2854/oj/eng Data Act ] foresees that data portability should support interoperability of data processing services, while data portability should also be ensured as part of the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng Digital Markets Act] gatekeeper obligations.		According to [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng#art_20 Article 20] of the General Data Protection Regulation, "[the data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided" where processing is based on consent or contract and is carried out by automated means. Additionally, the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2854/oj/eng Data Act ] foresees that data portability should support interoperability of data processing services, while data portability should also be ensured as part of the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng Digital Markets Act] gatekeeper obligations.
	== <span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">[[Data:Brazil\|Brazil]]</span></span> ==		= <span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">[[Data:Brazil\|Brazil]]</span></span> =
	<span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">in ~~progress~~</span></span>		<span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">Click on the link above to find out more about data portability in Brazil.</span></span>

	= China ~~- Ceren, Sergey, Juliette~~ =		= [[Data:China\|China]] =
	== 1. Overview ==
			= 1. Overview =
	<p>The Personal Information Protection Law ([https://en.spp.gov.cn/2021-12/29/c_948419.htm PIPL])  came into effect on 1 November 2021, much later than the General Data Protection Regulation ([https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R0679-20160504 GDPR]) which came into force on 24 May 2016. PIPL is China’s primary legal framework for personal information protection and has notable parallels with the GDPR, while reflecting distinctly Chinese regulatory priorities.</p>		<p>The Personal Information Protection Law ([https://en.spp.gov.cn/2021-12/29/c_948419.htm PIPL])  came into effect on 1 November 2021, much later than the General Data Protection Regulation ([https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R0679-20160504 GDPR]) which came into force on 24 May 2016. PIPL is China’s primary legal framework for personal information protection and has notable parallels with the GDPR, while reflecting distinctly Chinese regulatory priorities.</p>

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	<p>While data transfers outside of China should not be confused with the general right to data portability, the interplay between the two could be considered. A limitation, or a lack in the adoption of the right to data portability results in less flow of data both within China, and outside of China. While data transfers abroad do not form part of this exercise, it should also be noted that the main driving factor of EU’s data protection regime is the free flow of information within the internal market, while China does not take part in such a union and is therefore not incentivized by such a market goal.</p>		<p>While data transfers outside of China should not be confused with the general right to data portability, the interplay between the two could be considered. A limitation, or a lack in the adoption of the right to data portability results in less flow of data both within China, and outside of China. While data transfers abroad do not form part of this exercise, it should also be noted that the main driving factor of EU’s data protection regime is the free flow of information within the internal market, while China does not take part in such a union and is therefore not incentivized by such a market goal.</p>

	== <span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">[[Data:India\|India]]</span></span> ==		= <span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">[[Data:India\|India]]</span></span> =

	== <span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">[[Data Portability (USA)\|United States]]</span></span> ==		<span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">Click on the link above to find out more about data portability in India.</span></span>
	in ~~progress~~		= <span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">[[Data Portability (USA)\|United States]]</span></span> =
			<span dir="ltr" lang="en"><span class="mw-page-title-main">Click on the link above to find out more about data portability in the United States</span></span>

Data:India

Latorre Tallard Pablo — Sat, 10 Oct 2026 22:02:05 GMT

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:02, 11 October 2026
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			'''Words: 1911'''
	= Data Portability Rights =		= Data Portability Rights =
	<p style="text-align: justify;">Data portability rights entitle individuals to legally transfer their data from one data holder/processor to another in a structured, organized, and machine-readable format on a continuous basis. Commonly, data portability rights apply only to data that is digital and personal, and that is processed with consent or in the context of a contract performance (1). Additionally, data portability rights differentiate themselves from other data sharing approaches in that in them the personal data transfer is triggered by the individual’s initiative and not the data holder/processor’s (2).</p>		<p style="text-align: justify;">Data portability rights entitle individuals to legally transfer their data from one data holder/processor to another in a structured, organized, and machine-readable format on a continuous basis. Commonly, data portability rights apply only to data that is digital and personal, and that is processed with consent or in the context of a contract performance (1). Additionally, data portability rights differentiate themselves from other data sharing approaches in that in them the personal data transfer is triggered by the individual’s initiative and not the data holder/processor’s (2).</p>

Infrastructures:China

Latorre Tallard Pablo — Sat, 10 Oct 2026 21:58:32 GMT

References

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Infrastructures: Digital Sovereignty

Latorre Tallard Pablo — Sat, 10 Oct 2026 21:56:28 GMT

China

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Infrastructures:China

Latorre Tallard Pablo — Sat, 10 Oct 2026 21:54:59 GMT

Created page with "<p>'''Words: 2306'''<br></p><div><p><br></p></div><div> == '''Introduction''' == </div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" ><span style="font-size: 14.4px;">“Digital Sovereignty” is an increasingly important concept for understanding how States exercise political and economic control over digital infrastructures and technologies. Since the introduction of the Internet in 1994, Chinese academic and political discourse has formulated notions of cyber, information, and..."

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<p>'''Words: 2306'''<br></p><div><p><br></p></div><div>
== '''Introduction''' ==
</div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" ><span style="font-size: 14.4px;">“Digital Sovereignty” is an increasingly important concept for understanding how States exercise political and economic control over digital infrastructures and technologies. Since the introduction of the Internet in 1994, Chinese academic and political discourse has formulated notions of cyber, information, and network sovereignty in direct relation to digital and technological independence.</span><br></p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In the early 2000s, Chinese authorities focused primarily on controlling data flows rather than developing national technological champions. Indeed, at the time Google held around the 40% of the Chinese Internet search market and companies like Yahoo maintained substantial equity participation in Chinese firms like Alibaba, all of which ended in 2009 when the Urumqi riots triggered China’s decision to permanently block platforms like Facebook and YouTube, prompting Google’s withdrawal from the Chinese Internet search market.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In 2010 “Cyber Sovereignty” was crystallized as an organizing principle of Chinese digital policy following historical concerns about information control and a national determination to resist foreign influence over China. This political and economic landscape cemented the nation’s ambition to achieve full digital sovereignty.</p></div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" >Today Chinese digital sovereignty is incorporated into its legal framework, particularly in the Cybersecurity Law and the Data Security Law (both from 2017). These laws aim for China to develop the autonomy and capacity necessary to exercise full control over its information infrastructure and data.</p></div><div><p><br></p></div><div>
== '''Cybersecurity Law''' ==
</div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" >The Cybersecurity Law is a comprehensive legal framework that regulates cyberspace and information infrastructure security in China, governing information networks build, operation, and use within its territory (see article 2). The law covers a wide range of issues, including critical information infrastructure management, cybersecurity, and data protection.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In the area of critical information infrastructure management, the law applies to “Critical Information Infrastructures” (CIIs) and “Critical Information Infrastructure Operators” (CIIOs) which include information infrastructure and its operators in sectors such as energy, finance, healthcare, telecommunications, transportation, and governmental services. CIIOs have the obligation to adopt enhanced security measures and protocols to safeguard information infrastructure and their data. Additionally, CIIOs must perform regular security assessments and report their results to State agencies, implement protective measures and protocols, and cooperate with State agencies, among others (see articles 23, 36, 37, 38, and 40).</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In the area of cybersecurity, the law applies to all information infrastructure operators (not only to CIIOs) which have the obligation to adopt comprehensive cybersecurity measures which include monitoring their infrastructure security, safeguarding against data breaches, impeding misuse of their infrastructures for illegal activities, prepare incident response plans, report cybersecurity incidents, and cooperate with State agencies (see articles 23, 27, 30 and 51).</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>Finally, in the area of data protection, the law applies to CIIOs in the case of data localization, and to all information infrastructure operators in the case of personal information. CIIOs have the obligation to store within China all critical data and personal information they collect or generate in the country’s territory. Additionally, CIIOs must pass a security evaluation and get State authorization to transfer data abroad (see article 39). Moreover, all information infrastructure operators have the obligation to follow guidelines for collecting, processing, and storing personal information. In that sense, information infrastructure operators must secure user consent for gathering personal information and disclose it, and warrant its protection by implementing measures to guard against unauthorized or illegal access and misuse including breach notification (see article 42).</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>Additionally, the law establishes obligations for the State including to balance cybersecurity and information infrastructure development (see article 4), continuously improve the national cybersecurity strategy (see article 5), and deal with cybersecurity risks and threats (see article 6).</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In general, the law provides the State extensive powers to access data held by information infrastructure operators functioning within China, including the authority to require assistance and support in matters of national security or criminal investigations.</p></div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" >Infringing the law can result in sanctions for information infrastructure operators which include fines, operational suspensions, and business license revocations (individuals may face personal responsibility). In more extreme cases, where there is a threat to public order or national security, infringements can result in criminal prosecution and career suspension (see articles 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, and 76).</p></div><div><p><br></p></div><div>
== '''Data Security Law''' ==
</div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" ><span style="font-size: 14.4px;">The Data Security Law is a comprehensive legal framework that regulates data management for the purposes of national sovereignty, security, and social and economic development.</span><br></p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>It establishes the obligation of the State to develop a data classification system based on its importance to social and economic development and the damage its alteration, destruction, leakage, or illicit use would cause to national security, public interest, or people or organizations’ rights and interests. Such classification allows the State to apply varying protection levels depending on the data’s sensitivity and relevance, where “central data of the State” or data deemed important to national security, major public interests, critical economic sectors, or important aspects of people livelihood is given the highest level of protection (see article 21). Other categories of data are “important data” and “general data” which are not defined in the law but in complementary regulations.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>The law applies to data management carried out within China’s territory, and generates legal responsibility for data management outside if it harms national security, public interest, or people or organizations’ rights and interests (see article 2). Data processors of “important data” have the obligation to designate officers responsible for data security, to conduct risk evaluations periodically reporting the results to State authorities, and to report security incidents to users and State authorities, among others (see articles 27, 29 and 30). Moreover, data processors are impeded to transfer data to foreign judicial authorities without authorization (see article 36).</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>Additionally, the law establishes obligations for the State including to encourage the use of data for economic and innovation purposes, specifically for the development of new data-driven industries as long as they comply with the law (see article 1). Also, it has the obligation to coordinate the national data security, and draft and implement the national data security strategy (see article 5).</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In general the law enables the State to collect data if it is necessary to safeguard national security or investigate crimes, subject to approval procedures (see article 35). Data processors and individuals are obliged to cooperate, and refusal is subject to fines (see article 48).</p></div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" >Infringing the law can result in sanctions which include fines, operational suspensions, and business license revocations (individuals may face personal responsibility). In more extreme cases, where there is a crime or a threat to national sovereignty, security, or economic development interests, infringements can result in criminal prosecution (see articles 45 and 52).</p></div><div><p><br></p></div><div>
== '''Personal Information Protection Law''' ==
</div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" ><span style="font-size: 14.4px;">The Personal Information Protection Law (of 2021) is a comprehensive legal framework that protects personal information similarly to the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Although the law is not directly related to China’s digital sovereignty, it establishes obligations relevant to it: State agencies, critical infrastructure operators, and data processors that collect, process, or use data above a certain threshold (defined by State authorities) must store within China all personal information they collect or generate in the country’s territory. Additionally, they must pass a security evaluation and get State authorization to transfer data abroad (see articles 36 and 40).</span><br></p></div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" >Moreover, the State is allowed to blacklist individuals and organizations and deny them access to personal information generated or collected in China if it deems that they acted against Chinese people rights or interests, as well as to adopt reciprocal measures against foreign States if it deems that they discriminated against China regarding the protection of personal information (see articles 42 and 43).</p></div><div><p><br></p></div><div>
== '''China’s State Centered Concept of Digital Sovereignty''' ==
</div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" ><span style="font-size: 14.4px;">The Cybersecurity Law and the Data Security Law are integral parts of China’s strategy to strengthen its digital sovereignty. China’s concept of digital sovereignty is characterized for its strong State-centered approach in which the State holds ultimate and supreme authority in the digital space, controlling data flows and content sharing within its borders. In a sense, China’s concept of digital sovereignty is defensive: it is essential to protect China’s social, political, and economic architecture from destabilization attempts by foreign actors, which explains why the Cybersecurity Law establishes the obligation of private actors to </span><em style="font-size: 14.4px;">“abide by the Constitution and laws, observe public order, respect social morality, and (...) not (...) use the Internet to engage in activities that endanger national security, honor, or interests (...), incite subversion of State power or overthrow of the socialist system (...), incite secession or undermine national unity (...), (or) fabricate or disseminate false information to disrupt economic and social order”</em><span style="font-size: 14.4px;"> (see article 13), and why the the Data Security Law establishes as an objective to </span><em style="font-size: 14.4px;">“preserve State sovereignty, security, and development interests”</em><span style="font-size: 14.4px;"> (see article 1).</span><br></p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>Such a concept requires the achievement of two policy objectives: territorialization and indigenization. Through territorialization China seeks to replicate its national borders in cyberspace, ensuring that online processes impacting important national interests take place within Chinese boundaries, and unwanted practices or operations can be barred from entering. Through indigenization, in turn, it strives to replace foreign actors and technologies with local equivalents, reducing foreign dependence.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In this context, the Cybersecurity Law and the Data Security Law aim to protect China’s digital sovereignty through both policy objectives. In the case of territorialization, they establish the objective of protecting sovereignty in cyberspace and preventing and responding to cybersecurity risks and threats coming from inside and outside China; the obligation of CIIOs to store in China all personal information and important data that they generate or collect inside the country’s borders, and to conduct security evaluations and obtain State permission before transferring them abroad; the obligation of data processors to not transfer data to foreign judicial authorities without State authorization; the responsibility of data processors for activities carried out outside China; and the capacity of the State to block prohibited information, to temporarily restrict communications in specific areas for national security reasons, and to adopt countermeasures against foreign States that discriminate against China in data investment or trade.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>In the case of indigenization, the laws establish mechanisms of promotion and access control that indirectly privilege national providers. As an example, they establish the obligation of critical infrastructure operators to purchase information network products and services approved in a national security assessment; the obligation of critical information network products providers to offer products that are certified or comply with national standards; the obligation of the State to support Chinese cybersecurity industries and projects, to support Chinese Artificial Intelligence (AI) industries, to support data development and security industrial systems, to support the creation of national data markets, and to develop a national strategy for big data and data infrastructure.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>These efforts are related to the “Great Firewall”, the Chinese State system for censoring and controlling Internet traffic within its borders which is, arguably, the most visible example of territorialization, drawing an effective Internet frontier between China and the rest of the world.</p></div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" >In this way, China's digital sovereignty concept demands asserting control over information infrastructures and data gathered or generated within its borders as well as to protect relevant or sensitive information from foreign interference and cyber-attacks while simultaneously reinforcing its surveillance capacity and its ability to manage information flows for “social stability”.</p></div><div><p><br></p></div><div>
== '''China Model Versus the European Union Model''' ==
</div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" ><span style="font-size: 14.4px;">The European Union (EU) and China represent two different models of digital sovereignty. The EU approach contrasts with China’s State-centered and security-driven model because it emerged from a supranational, rights-centered, and democratic context.</span><br></p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>EU’s efforts to achieve digital sovereignty began in 2013 when Edward Snowden’s revelations of United States National Security Agency (NSA) interception of European communications exposed its dependence on foreign technology and triggered a wave of policy and regulatory efforts. Such efforts led to the adoption of the GDPR in 2016 which enshrined individuals' rights, including the rights of access to and objection to processing of personal data. The EU continued by developing two consumer protection regulations in 2019, in addition to conducting several antitrust proceedings against American hyperscalers such as Alphabet, Amazon, and Apple between 2015 and 2020. In 2024, the EU adopted the AI Act with the purpose of harmonizing AI development and deployment with EU values and fundamental rights. More recently, the EU initiated infrastructure initiatives such as Gaia X for cloud sovereignty and the Chips Act for semiconductor independence.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>Despite this extensive regulatory framework, China's claim to digital sovereignty may be considered more consolidated than the EU's because it fuses legal codification with direct State control over technology, information, and infrastructure in a way the EU market-correcting model does not yet.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>As European Commission President von der Leyen stated in 2019, ''"it is not too late to achieve technological sovereignty in some critical technology areas"''. The EU has been trying to catching up with China, which spent the last decade tightening its State authority over its digital infrastructure before the EU began treating its own technology dependence as a vulnerability. China's more recent legislative activity has extended this consolidation into the international stage as well as domestically. In 2024, the Shanghai Declaration on Global AI Governance, issued by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, committed signatories to developing AI under principles of safety, reliability, and controllability, while asserting each country's right to regulate AI according to its own national conditions. This language simultaneously projects openness to international cooperation while defending from non-foreign interference, the logic underpinning China's digital sovereignty doctrine.</p></div><div style="text-align: justify;" ><p>This declaration is not merely aspirational: it is anchored in binding domestic law, specifically Article 20 of China's Security Law, which directs the State to support AI research, infrastructure, ethical norms, and risk supervision.</p></div><div><p style="text-align: justify;" >Therefore, where the EU’s sovereignty is exercised primarily through regulating outside actors within its internal market, China's sovereignty is exercised through direct State-led development, information control, and an explicit fusion of domestic statutes and international declaratory positioning. This makes China's model arguably more comprehensive compared to the EU.</p></div><div><p><br></p>
== '''References''' ==
</div><div><p><strong style="font-size: 14.4px;">(1)</strong><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-size: 14.4px;"> </span><span style="font-size: 14.4px;">Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China (2025 Amendment).</span><br></p></div><div><p>'''(2)'''<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span>Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China (2021).</p></div><div><p>'''(3)'''<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span>Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (2021).</p></div><div><p>'''(4)'''<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Shanghai Declaration on Global AI Governance" (4 July 2024).</p></div><div><p>'''(5)'''<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span>Jiang, M. Models of State Digital Sovereignty From the Global South: Diverging Experiences From China, India and South Africa, Policy & Internet, 15 December 2024, </p>[https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.427' https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.427']</div><div><p>'''(6)'''<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span>Rivaton, R., “The Origins and Fate of Digital Sovereignty”, Fondation pour L’Innovation Politique, 21 may 2026, </p>[https://www.fondapol.org/decryptage/the-origins-and-fate-of-digital-sovereignty https://www.fondapol.org/decryptage/the-origins-and-fate-of-digital-sovereignty]</div><div style="text-align: justify;" >'''(7) '''Thumfart, J. & Cong. W., “A Chinese Precursor to the Digital Sovereignty Debate: Digital Anti-Colonialism and Authoritarianism from the Post–Cold War Era to the Tunis Agenda”, Global Studies Quarterly (2022) 2, 1–13.</div>

Infrastructures: Digital Sovereignty

Latorre Tallard Pablo — Sat, 10 Oct 2026 21:52:12 GMT

China

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Governance by markets

Latorre Tallard Pablo — Sat, 10 Oct 2026 21:50:16 GMT

Multi-homing (Juliette)

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 (4) Zhu F and Iansiti M, 'Why Some Platforms Thrive and Others Don't' (2019) Harvard Business Review (January–February) 118
 = Vertical Integration by Pablo Latorre =
 <p>'''1. Definition'''</p>
-= Vertical Integration by Pablo Latorre =<p>'''1. Definition'''</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“Vertical Integration” is the control by a single corporation of two or more consecutive steps of the same production chain of activity in such a manner that said corporation does not need to rely on others for them (1). In the context of digital markets, “Vertical Integration” usually refers to the position of a platform that operates a marketplace or infrastructure that other enterprises depend on and, at the same time, commercializes products or services in that same space (2). Therefore, in a “Vertical Integration” the platform is both, provider and competitor, of other enterprises.</p><p><br></p><p>'''2. Example: Amazon as a Marketplace'''</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Amazon operates the largest online marketplace (3) in the world and, thus, thousands of small and medium size enterprises depend on it to connect with their costumers. At the same time, Amazon commercializes its own products on its marketplace (4), acting as a retailer and competitor to those enterprises. Such dual role allows Amazon to exercise competitive advantages: first, it can access detailed, non-public data on the enterprises’ sales, including products, prices, and costumer behavior; and second, it can decide the rules that define the products that appear first as the result of a costumer search.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In 2022 Amazon had to commit to the European Commission to not use the enterprises’ non-public data for its retail business and to treat equally rival offers in its “Buy Box” (5). Currently, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) establishes matching general obligations for designated gatekeepers (6).</p><p><br></p><p>'''3. Governance Implication'''</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“Vertical Integration” allows platforms to exercise power over enterprises through digital architecture. When a platform operates a marketplace and competes in it, its ordinary decisions on digital architecture (i.e. on algorithms, searches, products visibility) can become tools for power and competition. In a sense, platforms are the ''de facto'' private regulators of markets in which they have clear commercial interests. Such state of affairs allows to understand a strategy change in antitrust cases. Traditionally, antitrust intervenes after the harm, however regulators are moving towards ''ex ante'' conduct rules (i.e. the DMA) (7).</p><p><br></p><p>'''4. Open Question'''</p><p style="text-align: justify;">“Vertical Integration” clearly explains the incentive structure that drives platforms to favor their own products through the exercise of digital architecture mediated competitive advantages. However, “Vertical Integration” assumes that the line between one product (i.e. the marketplace, the search engine) and the other (i.e. the products, the websites competing on the platform) is clear when, in practice, this is not always so. For instance, nowadays when a user search something in Google Search, Google not only provides links to websites that contain the desired information but also the desired information itself with AI-generated summaries. In this case, two possible perspectives arise: on the one hand, that Google could be abusing its position to capture the online information market by displacing websites that depend on it; on the other hand, that Google could be simply improving its search engine and search itself because what users actually want is information and not links to it. In this example, “Vertical Integration” is incapable of settling the issue because it depends on a clear distinction between one product and the other (or one market and the other) and that is absent in this case. Moreover, even if in the presented case was possible to separate one product from the other (or one market from the other), “Vertical Integration” does not provide a clear criteria to establish when an “integration” is abusive exclusion of competitors and when it is legitimate and necessary innovation.</p><p><br></p><p>'''References'''</p><p>(1) “Vertical integration” (''Cambridge Dictionary'') [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/vertical-integration https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/vertical-integration] accessed 4 October 2026.</p><p>(2) [https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article/6/3/355/5034073?itm_medium=sidebar&itm_source=trendmd-widget&itm_campaign=Journal_of_Antitrust_Enforcement&itm_content=Journal_of_Antitrust_Enforcement_0 Bostoen Friso, “Online Platforms and Vertical Integration: The Return of Margin Squeeze” (2018) (6) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 355.]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Lovell Keir, “Top 10 Ecommerce Marketplaces in the World: 2026 Rankings by GMV, Users & Reach” (''ServeRetail'', 2 January 2026) [https://www.serveretail.com/blog/marketplace/the-10-largest-ecommerce-marketplaces-in-the-world-size-reach-and-cx-strategy/ https://www.serveretail.com/blog/marketplace/the-10-largest-ecommerce-marketplaces-in-the-world-size-reach-and-cx-strategy/] accessed 4 October 2026.</p><p>(4) Ellison Mara, “What are Amazon's Brands, Explained” (''Ir Mountaintopuniversity Ng'') [https://ir.mountaintopuniversity.edu.ng/article/what-are-amazon-s-brands-explained https://ir.mountaintopuniversity.edu.ng/article/what-are-amazon-s-brands-explained] accessed 4 October 2026.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2023_087_R_0005 Summary of Commission Decision of 20 December 2022 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Cases AT.40462 – Amazon Marketplace, and AT.40703 – Amazon Buy Box) (2023) OJ C87.]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A265%3ATOC Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (2022).]</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) OECD, "Ex Ante Regulation and Competition in Digital Markets" (''OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, OECD Publishing 2021'') [https://doi.org/10.1787/c83e178d-en https://doi.org/10.1787/c83e178d-en] accessed 4 October 2026.</p>
+<p style="text-align: justify;">“Vertical Integration” is the control by a single corporation of two or more consecutive steps of the same production chain of activity in such a manner that said corporation does not need to rely on others for them (1). In the context of digital markets, “Vertical Integration” usually refers to the position of a platform that operates a marketplace or infrastructure that other enterprises depend on and, at the same time, commercializes products or services in that same space (2). Therefore, in a “Vertical Integration” the platform is both, provider and competitor, of other enterprises.</p>