Infrastructures: Digital Sovereignty - Revision history

Latorre Tallard Pablo: /* China */

2026-10-10T21:56:28Z

China

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Latorre Tallard Pablo: /* China */

2026-10-10T21:52:12Z

China

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Sergey Abramov: /* 4.1 Brasil Semicon (Law No. 14.968/2024) */

2026-10-01T13:18:07Z

4.1 Brasil Semicon (Law No. 14.968/2024)

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	=== 4.1 Brasil Semicon (Law No. 14.968/2024) ===		=== 4.1 Brasil Semicon (Law No. 14.968/2024) ===
	~~</div>~~
	<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>The Brazil Semiconductor Programme (Brasil Semicon), established under Law No. 14.968 of 11 September 2024, constitutes Brazil's principal hard law instrument for technological sovereignty in the semiconductor sector. It establishes a national strategy and guidelines to encourage research, development, innovation, production, and application of semiconductors, displays, and solar panels. Brasil Semicon updates and expands the instruments of PADIS (the Support Program for Technological Development of the Semiconductor Industry), extending tax incentives until the end of 2029 and broadening their scope to include software, specialised services, technical assistance, and other stages of the production chain. Decree No. 13.065 of 16 July 2026 activated the programme, establishing the rules for the semiconductor industry and facilitating access to PADIS tax incentives. The programme aims to attract investments in the national chip supply chain until 2029, directly addressing Brazil's dependence on foreign semiconductor manufacturing. </p></div>		<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>The Brazil Semiconductor Programme (Brasil Semicon), established under [https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/2024/lei-14968-11-setembro-2024-796221-publicacaooriginal-172984-pl.html Law No. 14.968] of 11 September 2024, constitutes Brazil's principal hard law instrument for technological sovereignty in the semiconductor sector. It establishes a national strategy and guidelines to encourage research, development, innovation, production, and application of semiconductors, displays, and solar panels. Brasil Semicon updates and expands the instruments of PADIS (the Support Program for Technological Development of the Semiconductor Industry), extending tax incentives until the end of 2029 and broadening their scope to include software, specialised services, technical assistance, and other stages of the production chain. Decree No. 13.065 of 16 July 2026 activated the programme, establishing the rules for the semiconductor industry and facilitating access to PADIS tax incentives. The programme aims to attract investments in the national chip supply chain until 2029, directly addressing Brazil's dependence on foreign semiconductor manufacturing. </p></div>
	<div style="font-weight: 400;"><div>		<div style="font-weight: 400;"><div></div></div>

	=== 4.2 National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals (Law No. 15.506/2026) ===		=== 4.2 National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals (Law No. 15.506/2026) ===

Sergey Abramov: /* 4.2 National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals (Law No. 15.506/2026) */

2026-10-01T13:12:55Z

4.2 National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals (Law No. 15.506/2026)

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	=== 4.2 National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals (Law No. 15.506/2026) ===		=== 4.2 National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals (Law No. 15.506/2026) ===
	~~</div>~~
	<div><p>Published on 16 September 2026, Law No. 15.506/2026 establishes a national policy and governance structure for critical and strategic minerals. It aims to promote research, extraction, processing, and transformation of critical and strategic minerals domestically, adding value to supply chains rather than exporting raw materials. The policy explicitly seeks to strengthen Brazil's economic and geopolitical security by ensuring a stable domestic supply of minerals essential to the digital economy — including those required for semiconductors, batteries, and AI hardware. It provides up to R$5 billion in tax credits (covering up to 20% of eligible expenses) from 2030 through 2034 for mineral processing, manufacturing, and recycling projects, and authorises a Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund with up to R$2 billion in federal contributions. This law is significant because Brazil holds some of the world's largest reserves of rare earth minerals and other critical inputs for the digital economy, and the policy represents a strategic decision to leverage these resources for domestic technological development rather than simply exporting them. </p></div>		<div><p>Published on 16 September 2026, [https://legis.senado.leg.br/norma/43923839/publicacao/43929692 Law No. 15.506/2026] establishes a national policy and governance structure for critical and strategic minerals. It aims to promote research, extraction, processing, and transformation of critical and strategic minerals domestically, adding value to supply chains rather than exporting raw materials. The policy explicitly seeks to strengthen Brazil's economic and geopolitical security by ensuring a stable domestic supply of minerals essential to the digital economy — including those required for semiconductors, batteries, and AI hardware. It provides up to R$5 billion in tax credits (covering up to 20% of eligible expenses) from 2030 through 2034 for mineral processing, manufacturing, and recycling projects, and authorises a Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund with up to R$2 billion in federal contributions. This law is significant because Brazil holds some of the world's largest reserves of rare earth minerals and other critical inputs for the digital economy, and the policy represents a strategic decision to leverage these resources for domestic technological development rather than simply exporting them. </p></div>
	<div>		<div></div>

	== 5. The EU–Brazil Digital Partnership (2026) ==		== 5. The EU–Brazil Digital Partnership (2026) ==

Sergey Abramov: /* 3.2 Brazilian AI Plan (PBIA, 2024–2028) */

2026-10-01T13:07:41Z

3.2 Brazilian AI Plan (PBIA, 2024–2028)

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	=== 3.2 Brazilian AI Plan (PBIA, 2024–2028) ===		=== 3.2 Brazilian AI Plan (PBIA, 2024–2028) ===
	~~</div>~~
	<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>The Plano Brasileiro de Inteligência Artificial (PBIA), launched on 30 July 2024 under the motto "AI for the Good of All," builds on EBIA by translating strategic vision into a concrete investment and infrastructure roadmap. Approved by the National Council for Science and Technology and coordinated by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, the PBIA is a strategic non-binding soft-law policy framework with a planned investment of R$23.03 billion through 2028. </p></div>		<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>The Plano Brasileiro de Inteligência Artificial ([https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/transformacaodigital/ai-for-the-good-of-all-2025.pdf PBIA]), launched on 30 July 2024 under the motto "AI for the Good of All," builds on EBIA by translating strategic vision into a concrete investment and infrastructure roadmap. Approved by the National Council for Science and Technology and coordinated by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, the PBIA is a strategic non-binding soft-law policy framework with a planned investment of R$23.03 billion through 2028. </p></div>
	<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>The PBIA combines immediate-impact initiatives with structural actions organised into five axes. These actions aim to develop the capabilities and skills needed for sustainable AI development in Brazil, while strengthening national sovereignty, technological autonomy, competitiveness and responsible innovation. Approximately 98.1% of planned investment is directed towards these structural actions. AI for Business Innovation (59.9%), Infrastructure and AI Development (25.2%), and AI for Improving Public Services (7.6%) receive the largest shares, followed by Dissemination, Education and Training in AI (5.0%). Support for AI Regulation and Governance receives approximately 0.4%. This distribution indicates an emphasis on building technological and industrial capacity. It is also indicative that Brazil prioritizes developing the technology infrastructure over implementing regulation in the form of hard law. From a digital sovereignty perspective, several elements of the PBIA are particularly significant. The Infrastructure and AI Development axis includes a National AI Infrastructure Program aimed at investing in high-performance computing and autonomous AI hardware to support technological sovereignty. It also includes a Sustainability and Renewable Energy Programme for AI, supporting renewable-energy infrastructure and efficient resource use, and a Programme for Structuring the Data and Software Ecosystem for AI intended to reduce external dependence, improve training datasets and develop a national AI software stack. AI for improving public services axis provides for a Sovereign Cloud, private or community cloud infrastructure managed exclusively by public agencies or state-owned companies, to increase control, security and sovereignty over sensitive data and ensure it is stored on national territory. The AI for Business Innovation axis aims to support sectors within the AI production chain, including information and communication technologies (ICT) and microelectronics, and to position Brazil as a global data centre hub. The PBIA reports that Brazil currently operates only 168 data centres (ranking 13th globally, compared to over 5,000 in the United States). Its AI Value Chain Promotion Programme seeks to strengthen and expand the domestic AI value chain, from supporting startups to developing Brazilian companies supplying foundation models. </p></div>		<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>The PBIA combines immediate-impact initiatives with structural actions organised into five axes. These actions aim to develop the capabilities and skills needed for sustainable AI development in Brazil, while strengthening national sovereignty, technological autonomy, competitiveness and responsible innovation. Approximately 98.1% of planned investment is directed towards these structural actions. AI for Business Innovation (59.9%), Infrastructure and AI Development (25.2%), and AI for Improving Public Services (7.6%) receive the largest shares, followed by Dissemination, Education and Training in AI (5.0%). Support for AI Regulation and Governance receives approximately 0.4%. This distribution indicates an emphasis on building technological and industrial capacity. It is also indicative that Brazil prioritizes developing the technology infrastructure over implementing regulation in the form of hard law. From a digital sovereignty perspective, several elements of the PBIA are particularly significant. The Infrastructure and AI Development axis includes a National AI Infrastructure Program aimed at investing in high-performance computing and autonomous AI hardware to support technological sovereignty. It also includes a Sustainability and Renewable Energy Programme for AI, supporting renewable-energy infrastructure and efficient resource use, and a Programme for Structuring the Data and Software Ecosystem for AI intended to reduce external dependence, improve training datasets and develop a national AI software stack. AI for improving public services axis provides for a Sovereign Cloud, private or community cloud infrastructure managed exclusively by public agencies or state-owned companies, to increase control, security and sovereignty over sensitive data and ensure it is stored on national territory. The AI for Business Innovation axis aims to support sectors within the AI production chain, including information and communication technologies (ICT) and microelectronics, and to position Brazil as a global data centre hub. The PBIA reports that Brazil currently operates only 168 data centres (ranking 13th globally, compared to over 5,000 in the United States). Its AI Value Chain Promotion Programme seeks to strengthen and expand the domestic AI value chain, from supporting startups to developing Brazilian companies supplying foundation models. </p></div>
	<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>Bill No PL 2338/2023, which proposes a comprehensive AI framework, has passed the Senate and remains under consideration in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Brazil’s National Congress. Until it is enacted, Brazil's AI governance framework remains largely in the realm of soft law, creating legal uncertainty for investors, developers, and citizens alike. </p></div>		<div style="font-weight: 400;"><p>Bill No PL 2338/2023, which proposes a comprehensive AI framework, has passed the Senate and remains under consideration in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Brazil’s National Congress. Until it is enacted, Brazil's AI governance framework remains largely in the realm of soft law, creating legal uncertainty for investors, developers, and citizens alike. </p></div>
	<div style="font-weight: 400;">		<div style="font-weight: 400;"></div>

	== 4. Regulatory Framework: Semiconductors and Critical Minerals ==		== 4. Regulatory Framework: Semiconductors and Critical Minerals ==
	</div>		</div>

Paul Stein: /* The Four Registers */

2026-09-25T15:32:34Z

The Four Registers

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	*Pillar 3: Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security – Ensuring its global hegemonic position in AI technology<p>As explicitly stated from the plan, their core interest is in winning the race and securing its geopolitical primacy relative to other competitors rather than enhancing its authority and capacity over its domestic digital governance. The Plan itself has no legal force, yet the actual implementation is played by executive orders and procurements.</p>		*Pillar 3: Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security – Ensuring its global hegemonic position in AI technology<p>As explicitly stated from the plan, their core interest is in winning the race and securing its geopolitical primacy relative to other competitors rather than enhancing its authority and capacity over its domestic digital governance. The Plan itself has no legal force, yet the actual implementation is played by executive orders and procurements.</p>
	=== The Four Registers ===		=== The Four Registers ===
	<p>American digital policy has an organising purpose, and it is not regulation. It is primacy: maintaining American advantage in the technologies that determine economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, of which China is the principal one. The framing is stated in the instruments themselves — the order that set the current course is titled Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and the strategy it produced is titled Winning the Race. Beneath that strategy, the United States steers digital developments through four registers, descending in legal formality and ascending in speed.</p><p>'''Statute''' is the thinnest register. The [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] and the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act] are both narrow and adversary-specific, and general legislation has failed: the Senate stripped a ten-year moratorium on state enforcement of AI laws from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act by a vote of 99 to 1.</p><p>'''Executive orders''' carry the load. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] produced the Data Security Program, an export control keyed to adversary identity rather than to any standard of protection; Executive Order 14320 finances the export of full-stack American AI packages; Executive Order 14365 asserts a national AI framework and directs litigation against inconsistent state laws.</p><p>'''Procurement''' is quieter and more effective, and illustrated below by the cloud and semiconductor sectors.</p><p>'''Announcement''' is the fastest register and the least examined. On 19 January 2025 the President posted on Truth Social that he would issue an order extending the statutory TikTok divestment deadline, and [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/19/trump-tiktok-ban-executive-order TikTok restored service] in the United States the same day, before any instrument existed. A platform serving some 170 million US users changed its conduct based solely on anticipated legality.</p>		<p>American digital policy has an organising purpose, and it is not regulation. It is primacy: maintaining American advantage in the technologies that determine economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, of which China is the principal one. The framing is stated in the instruments themselves — the order that set the current course is titled Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and the strategy it produced is titled Winning the Race. Beneath that strategy, the United States steers digital developments through four registers, descending in legal formality and ascending in speed.</p>
			<p>'''Statute''' is the thinnest register. The [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] and the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act] are both narrow and adversary-specific, and general legislation has failed: the Senate stripped a ten-year moratorium on state enforcement of AI laws from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act by a vote of 99 to 1.</p>
			<p>'''Executive orders''' carry the load. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] produced the Data Security Program, an export control keyed to adversary identity rather than to any standard of protection; Executive Order 14320 finances the export of full-stack American AI packages; Executive Order 14365 asserts a national AI framework and directs litigation against inconsistent state laws.</p>
			<p>'''Procurement''' is quieter and more effective, and illustrated below by the cloud and semiconductor sectors.</p>
			<p>'''Announcement''' is the fastest register and the least examined. On 19 January 2025 the President posted on Truth Social that he would issue an order extending the statutory TikTok divestment deadline, and [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/19/trump-tiktok-ban-executive-order TikTok restored service] in the United States the same day, before any instrument existed. A platform serving some 170 million US users changed its conduct based solely on anticipated legality.</p>

	=== Direction of Travel ===<p>Policy directionality is consistent across all four registers and runs four ways. Outward, the export programme pushes the domestic AI stack into third markets. Inward, the Data Security Program and Team Telecom review screen foreign access based on a counterparty's identity rather than the safeguards it offers. Homeward, subsidy builds domestic capacity. Downward, federal policy presses on the states, and it is working even though preemption ordinarily requires a congressional enactment: Colorado repealed its 2024 AI Act in May 2026 and replaced it with a narrower automated decision-making statute stripped of deployer impact-assessment duties, while California's frontier AI statute (SB 53) contains a federal-deference clause under which compliance with a comparable federal framework discharges the state obligation. States are deferring in advance to a federal standard that does not yet exist.</p><p>Outward and homeward movement build the US position; inward and downward movement defend it against interference, foreign in the former case and domestic in the latter. The same adversary-identity test recurs in an export control, a subsidy condition, and a screening review alike.</p>		=== Direction of Travel ===
			<p>Policy directionality is consistent across all four registers and runs four ways. Outward, the export programme pushes the domestic AI stack into third markets. Inward, the Data Security Program and Team Telecom review screen foreign access based on a counterparty's identity rather than the safeguards it offers. Homeward, subsidy builds domestic capacity. Downward, federal policy presses on the states, and it is working even though preemption ordinarily requires a congressional enactment: Colorado repealed its 2024 AI Act in May 2026 and replaced it with a narrower automated decision-making statute stripped of deployer impact-assessment duties, while California's frontier AI statute (SB 53) contains a federal-deference clause under which compliance with a comparable federal framework discharges the state obligation. States are deferring in advance to a federal standard that does not yet exist.</p>
			<p>Outward and homeward movement build the US position; inward and downward movement defend it against interference, foreign in the former case and domestic in the latter. The same adversary-identity test recurs in an export control, a subsidy condition, and a screening review alike.</p>

	== US Infrastructure and Resources efforts for AI dominance ==		== US Infrastructure and Resources efforts for AI dominance ==

Paul Stein: /* Supply Chain management and Semiconductors */

2026-09-25T15:32:10Z

Supply Chain management and Semiconductors

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	CHIPS award recipients are also barred by law from using federal funds to pay shareholder dividends or buy back stock, a restriction the [https://www.nist.gov/document/approach-capital-allocation-policies CHIPS Program Office] has sought to extend for five years from the date of an award.		CHIPS award recipients are also barred by law from using federal funds to pay shareholder dividends or buy back stock, a restriction the [https://www.nist.gov/document/approach-capital-allocation-policies CHIPS Program Office] has sought to extend for five years from the date of an award.
			=== Supply Chain Management and Rare Earth Minerals ===
	=== Supply Chain Management and Rare Earth Minerals ===<p class="mwt-heading">AI systems require advanced semiconductors, semiconductors require rare earth elements and critical minerals,  and the United States currently remains reliant on processing capacity concentrated in China. Where the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] addresses the fabrication layer, a separate and more fragmented body of law addresses the mineral layer beneath it. Unlike the EU's [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj/eng Critical Raw Materials Act], the American framework layers a foundational statute, an executive order, and a narrower defense-procurement statute.<br></p>		<p class="mwt-heading">AI systems require advanced semiconductors, semiconductors require rare earth elements and critical minerals,  and the United States currently remains reliant on processing capacity concentrated in China. Where the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] addresses the fabrication layer, a separate and more fragmented body of law addresses the mineral layer beneath it. Unlike the EU's [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj/eng Critical Raw Materials Act], the American framework layers a foundational statute, an executive order, and a narrower defense-procurement statute.<br></p>

	==== Energy Act of 2020 ====		==== Energy Act of 2020 ====

Paul Stein: /* United States */

2026-09-25T15:31:42Z

United States

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	= United States =		= United States =
	== The Concept of Digital Sovereignty ==<p>The idea of “digital sovereignty” is not a single concept. There are a number of scholars who attempted to define digital sovereignty. [https://www.academia.edu/99043334/What_does_the_notion_of_sovereignty_mean_when_referring_to_the_digital Couture and Toupin] and [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343611573_The_Fight_for_Digital_Sovereignty_What_It_Is_and_Why_It_Matters_Especially_for_the_EU Floridi] emphasized the '''control''' over the digital realm, in which Floridi saw a combination of democratic legitimacy with innovative flexibility by a hybrid system of control. On the other hand, [https://techreg.org/article/view/23778?articlesBySimilarityPage=1 Chung] looked into the aspect of '''authority''' by defining digital sovereignty as a state’s ability to define, implement and enforce political and legal decisions across digital systems, platforms and data infrastructures. She also reconceptualized the term by asserting that sovereignty should be understood as governance '''capacity''' rather than exclusive control. There is a variety of perspectives in determining what digital sovereignty means and conflicting definitions based on varying national strategies.</p><p>The definition of digital sovereignty adopted throughout this study is a merge of authority and practical capacity of a state to set, apply and defend its own rules governing the digital infrastructure, data flows and algorithmic systems that shape its legal and political orders, against interference by outside actors, whether public or private, including other levels of government within the same state.</p>		=== The Concept of Digital Sovereignty ===
			<p>The idea of “digital sovereignty” is not a single concept. There are a number of scholars who attempted to define digital sovereignty. [https://www.academia.edu/99043334/What_does_the_notion_of_sovereignty_mean_when_referring_to_the_digital Couture and Toupin] and [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343611573_The_Fight_for_Digital_Sovereignty_What_It_Is_and_Why_It_Matters_Especially_for_the_EU Floridi] emphasized the '''control''' over the digital realm, in which Floridi saw a combination of democratic legitimacy with innovative flexibility by a hybrid system of control. On the other hand, [https://techreg.org/article/view/23778?articlesBySimilarityPage=1 Chung] looked into the aspect of '''authority''' by defining digital sovereignty as a state’s ability to define, implement and enforce political and legal decisions across digital systems, platforms and data infrastructures. She also reconceptualized the term by asserting that sovereignty should be understood as governance '''capacity''' rather than exclusive control. There is a variety of perspectives in determining what digital sovereignty means and conflicting definitions based on varying national strategies.</p><p>The definition of digital sovereignty adopted throughout this study is a merge of authority and practical capacity of a state to set, apply and defend its own rules governing the digital infrastructure, data flows and algorithmic systems that shape its legal and political orders, against interference by outside actors, whether public or private, including other levels of government within the same state.</p>
	=== The United States Sovereignty Strategy: AI Dominance ===<p>Unlike the EU who attempts to maintain digital sovereignty under its regulatory control, the idea of securing digital sovereignty is not its priority for the US. Their goal is to ensure geopolitical dominance by entrenching American advantage in the technologies that determine their economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, namely China as the principal one.</p><p>From ''[https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan]'', Issued on 23 July 2025, the US outlines 103 recommended actions by three pillars:</p>		=== The United States Sovereignty Strategy: AI Dominance ===
			<p>Unlike the EU who attempts to maintain digital sovereignty under its regulatory control, the idea of securing digital sovereignty is not its priority for the US. Their goal is to ensure geopolitical dominance by entrenching American advantage in the technologies that determine their economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, namely China as the principal one.</p><p>From ''[https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan]'', Issued on 23 July 2025, the US outlines 103 recommended actions by three pillars:</p>

	*Pillar 1: Accelerate AI Innovation – removing “bureaucratic red tapes” which hinder technological advancement by deregulation		*Pillar 1: Accelerate AI Innovation – removing “bureaucratic red tapes” which hinder technological advancement by deregulation
	*Pillar 2: Build American AI Infrastructure – fostering an environment conducive to AI innovations		*Pillar 2: Build American AI Infrastructure – fostering an environment conducive to AI innovations
	*Pillar 3: Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security – Ensuring its global hegemonic position in AI technology<p>As explicitly stated from the plan, their core interest is in winning the race and securing its geopolitical primacy relative to other competitors rather than enhancing its authority and capacity over its domestic digital governance. The Plan itself has no legal force, yet the actual implementation is played by executive orders and procurements.</p>		*Pillar 3: Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security – Ensuring its global hegemonic position in AI technology<p>As explicitly stated from the plan, their core interest is in winning the race and securing its geopolitical primacy relative to other competitors rather than enhancing its authority and capacity over its domestic digital governance. The Plan itself has no legal force, yet the actual implementation is played by executive orders and procurements.</p>
			=== The Four Registers ===
	== The Four Registers ==<p>American digital policy has an organising purpose, and it is not regulation. It is primacy: maintaining American advantage in the technologies that determine economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, of which China is the principal one. The framing is stated in the instruments themselves — the order that set the current course is titled Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and the strategy it produced is titled Winning the Race. Beneath that strategy, the United States steers digital developments through four registers, descending in legal formality and ascending in speed.</p><p>'''Statute''' is the thinnest register. The [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] and the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act] are both narrow and adversary-specific, and general legislation has failed: the Senate stripped a ten-year moratorium on state enforcement of AI laws from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act by a vote of 99 to 1.</p><p>'''Executive orders''' carry the load. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] produced the Data Security Program, an export control keyed to adversary identity rather than to any standard of protection; Executive Order 14320 finances the export of full-stack American AI packages; Executive Order 14365 asserts a national AI framework and directs litigation against inconsistent state laws.</p><p>'''Procurement''' is quieter and more effective, and illustrated below by the cloud and semiconductor sectors.</p><p>'''Announcement''' is the fastest register and the least examined. On 19 January 2025 the President posted on Truth Social that he would issue an order extending the statutory TikTok divestment deadline, and [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/19/trump-tiktok-ban-executive-order TikTok restored service] in the United States the same day, before any instrument existed. A platform serving some 170 million US users changed its conduct based solely on anticipated legality.</p>		<p>American digital policy has an organising purpose, and it is not regulation. It is primacy: maintaining American advantage in the technologies that determine economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, of which China is the principal one. The framing is stated in the instruments themselves — the order that set the current course is titled Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and the strategy it produced is titled Winning the Race. Beneath that strategy, the United States steers digital developments through four registers, descending in legal formality and ascending in speed.</p><p>'''Statute''' is the thinnest register. The [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] and the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act] are both narrow and adversary-specific, and general legislation has failed: the Senate stripped a ten-year moratorium on state enforcement of AI laws from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act by a vote of 99 to 1.</p><p>'''Executive orders''' carry the load. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] produced the Data Security Program, an export control keyed to adversary identity rather than to any standard of protection; Executive Order 14320 finances the export of full-stack American AI packages; Executive Order 14365 asserts a national AI framework and directs litigation against inconsistent state laws.</p><p>'''Procurement''' is quieter and more effective, and illustrated below by the cloud and semiconductor sectors.</p><p>'''Announcement''' is the fastest register and the least examined. On 19 January 2025 the President posted on Truth Social that he would issue an order extending the statutory TikTok divestment deadline, and [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/19/trump-tiktok-ban-executive-order TikTok restored service] in the United States the same day, before any instrument existed. A platform serving some 170 million US users changed its conduct based solely on anticipated legality.</p>

	=== Direction of Travel ===<p>Policy directionality is consistent across all four registers and runs four ways. Outward, the export programme pushes the domestic AI stack into third markets. Inward, the Data Security Program and Team Telecom review screen foreign access based on a counterparty's identity rather than the safeguards it offers. Homeward, subsidy builds domestic capacity. Downward, federal policy presses on the states, and it is working even though preemption ordinarily requires a congressional enactment: Colorado repealed its 2024 AI Act in May 2026 and replaced it with a narrower automated decision-making statute stripped of deployer impact-assessment duties, while California's frontier AI statute (SB 53) contains a federal-deference clause under which compliance with a comparable federal framework discharges the state obligation. States are deferring in advance to a federal standard that does not yet exist.</p><p>Outward and homeward movement build the US position; inward and downward movement defend it against interference, foreign in the former case and domestic in the latter. The same adversary-identity test recurs in an export control, a subsidy condition, and a screening review alike.</p>		=== Direction of Travel ===<p>Policy directionality is consistent across all four registers and runs four ways. Outward, the export programme pushes the domestic AI stack into third markets. Inward, the Data Security Program and Team Telecom review screen foreign access based on a counterparty's identity rather than the safeguards it offers. Homeward, subsidy builds domestic capacity. Downward, federal policy presses on the states, and it is working even though preemption ordinarily requires a congressional enactment: Colorado repealed its 2024 AI Act in May 2026 and replaced it with a narrower automated decision-making statute stripped of deployer impact-assessment duties, while California's frontier AI statute (SB 53) contains a federal-deference clause under which compliance with a comparable federal framework discharges the state obligation. States are deferring in advance to a federal standard that does not yet exist.</p><p>Outward and homeward movement build the US position; inward and downward movement defend it against interference, foreign in the former case and domestic in the latter. The same adversary-identity test recurs in an export control, a subsidy condition, and a screening review alike.</p>

Paul Stein: /* United States */

2026-09-25T15:30:37Z

United States

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:30, 25 September 2026
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	= United States =		= United States =
	== The Concept of Digital Sovereignty ==		== The Concept of Digital Sovereignty ==<p>The idea of “digital sovereignty” is not a single concept. There are a number of scholars who attempted to define digital sovereignty. [https://www.academia.edu/99043334/What_does_the_notion_of_sovereignty_mean_when_referring_to_the_digital Couture and Toupin] and [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343611573_The_Fight_for_Digital_Sovereignty_What_It_Is_and_Why_It_Matters_Especially_for_the_EU Floridi] emphasized the '''control''' over the digital realm, in which Floridi saw a combination of democratic legitimacy with innovative flexibility by a hybrid system of control. On the other hand, [https://techreg.org/article/view/23778?articlesBySimilarityPage=1 Chung] looked into the aspect of '''authority''' by defining digital sovereignty as a state’s ability to define, implement and enforce political and legal decisions across digital systems, platforms and data infrastructures. She also reconceptualized the term by asserting that sovereignty should be understood as governance '''capacity''' rather than exclusive control. There is a variety of perspectives in determining what digital sovereignty means and conflicting definitions based on varying national strategies.</p><p>The definition of digital sovereignty adopted throughout this study is a merge of authority and practical capacity of a state to set, apply and defend its own rules governing the digital infrastructure, data flows and algorithmic systems that shape its legal and political orders, against interference by outside actors, whether public or private, including other levels of government within the same state.</p>
	<p>The idea of “digital sovereignty” is not a single concept. There are a number of scholars who attempted to define digital sovereignty. [https://www.academia.edu/99043334/What_does_the_notion_of_sovereignty_mean_when_referring_to_the_digital Couture and Toupin] and [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343611573_The_Fight_for_Digital_Sovereignty_What_It_Is_and_Why_It_Matters_Especially_for_the_EU Floridi] emphasized the '''control''' over the digital realm, in which Floridi saw a combination of democratic legitimacy with innovative flexibility by a hybrid system of control. On the other hand, [https://techreg.org/article/view/23778?articlesBySimilarityPage=1 Chung] looked into the aspect of '''authority''' by defining digital sovereignty as a state’s ability to define, implement and enforce political and legal decisions across digital systems, platforms and data infrastructures. She also reconceptualized the term by asserting that sovereignty should be understood as governance '''capacity''' rather than exclusive control. There is a variety of perspectives in determining what digital sovereignty means and conflicting definitions based on varying national strategies.</p><p>The definition of digital sovereignty adopted throughout this study is a merge of authority and practical capacity of a state to set, apply and defend its own rules governing the digital infrastructure, data flows and algorithmic systems that shape its legal and political orders, against interference by outside actors, whether public or private, including other levels of government within the same state.</p>
	=== The United States Sovereignty Strategy: AI Dominance ===		=== The United States Sovereignty Strategy: AI Dominance ===<p>Unlike the EU who attempts to maintain digital sovereignty under its regulatory control, the idea of securing digital sovereignty is not its priority for the US. Their goal is to ensure geopolitical dominance by entrenching American advantage in the technologies that determine their economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, namely China as the principal one.</p><p>From ''[https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan]'', Issued on 23 July 2025, the US outlines 103 recommended actions by three pillars:</p>
	<p>Unlike the EU who attempts to maintain digital sovereignty under its regulatory control, the idea of securing digital sovereignty is not its priority for the US. Their goal is to ensure geopolitical dominance by entrenching American advantage in the technologies that determine their economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, namely China as the principal one.</p><p>From ''[https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan]'', Issued on 23 July 2025, the US outlines 103 recommended actions by three pillars:</p>

	*Pillar 1: Accelerate AI Innovation – removing “bureaucratic red tapes” which hinder technological advancement by deregulation		*Pillar 1: Accelerate AI Innovation – removing “bureaucratic red tapes” which hinder technological advancement by deregulation
	*Pillar 2: Build American AI Infrastructure – fostering an environment conducive to AI innovations		*Pillar 2: Build American AI Infrastructure – fostering an environment conducive to AI innovations
	*Pillar 3: Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security – Ensuring its global hegemonic position in AI technology<p>As explicitly stated from the plan, their core interest is in winning the race and securing its geopolitical primacy relative to other competitors rather than enhancing its authority and capacity over its domestic digital governance. The Plan itself has no legal force, yet the actual implementation is played by executive orders and procurements.</p>		*Pillar 3: Lead in International AI Diplomacy and Security – Ensuring its global hegemonic position in AI technology<p>As explicitly stated from the plan, their core interest is in winning the race and securing its geopolitical primacy relative to other competitors rather than enhancing its authority and capacity over its domestic digital governance. The Plan itself has no legal force, yet the actual implementation is played by executive orders and procurements.</p>
	== The Four Registers ==
	<p>American digital policy has an organising purpose, and it is not regulation. It is primacy: maintaining American advantage in the technologies that determine economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, of which China is the principal one. The framing is stated in the instruments themselves — the order that set the current course is titled Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and the strategy it produced is titled Winning the Race. Beneath that strategy, the United States steers digital developments through four registers, descending in legal formality and ascending in speed.</p><p>'''Statute''' is the thinnest register. The [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] and the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act] are both narrow and adversary-specific, and general legislation has failed: the Senate stripped a ten-year moratorium on state enforcement of AI laws from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act by a vote of 99 to 1.</p><p>'''Executive orders''' carry the load. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] produced the Data Security Program, an export control keyed to adversary identity rather than to any standard of protection; Executive Order 14320 finances the export of full-stack American AI packages; Executive Order 14365 asserts a national AI framework and directs litigation against inconsistent state laws.</p><p>'''Procurement''' is quieter and ~~probably~~ more effective, and is illustrated below by the cloud and semiconductor sectors.</p><p>'''Announcement''' is the fastest register and the least examined. On 19 January 2025 the President posted on Truth Social that he would issue an order extending the statutory TikTok divestment deadline, and [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/19/trump-tiktok-ban-executive-order TikTok restored service] in the United States the same day, before any instrument existed. A platform serving some 170 million US users changed its conduct based solely on anticipated legality.</p>		== The Four Registers ==<p>American digital policy has an organising purpose, and it is not regulation. It is primacy: maintaining American advantage in the technologies that determine economic and military standing, against a field of competitors, of which China is the principal one. The framing is stated in the instruments themselves — the order that set the current course is titled Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and the strategy it produced is titled Winning the Race. Beneath that strategy, the United States steers digital developments through four registers, descending in legal formality and ascending in speed.</p><p>'''Statute''' is the thinnest register. The [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] and the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act] are both narrow and adversary-specific, and general legislation has failed: the Senate stripped a ten-year moratorium on state enforcement of AI laws from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act by a vote of 99 to 1.</p><p>'''Executive orders''' carry the load. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] produced the Data Security Program, an export control keyed to adversary identity rather than to any standard of protection; Executive Order 14320 finances the export of full-stack American AI packages; Executive Order 14365 asserts a national AI framework and directs litigation against inconsistent state laws.</p><p>'''Procurement''' is quieter and more effective, and illustrated below by the cloud and semiconductor sectors.</p><p>'''Announcement''' is the fastest register and the least examined. On 19 January 2025 the President posted on Truth Social that he would issue an order extending the statutory TikTok divestment deadline, and [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/19/trump-tiktok-ban-executive-order TikTok restored service] in the United States the same day, before any instrument existed. A platform serving some 170 million US users changed its conduct based solely on anticipated legality.</p>
	=== Direction of Travel ===
	<p>~~The direction of policy~~ is consistent across all four registers and runs four ways. Outward, the export programme pushes the domestic AI stack into third markets. Inward, the Data Security Program and Team Telecom review screen foreign access based on a counterparty's identity rather than the safeguards it offers. Homeward, subsidy builds domestic capacity. Downward, federal policy presses on the states, and it is working even though preemption ordinarily requires a congressional enactment: Colorado repealed its 2024 AI Act in May 2026 and replaced it with a narrower automated decision-making statute stripped of deployer impact-assessment duties, while California's frontier AI statute (SB 53) contains a federal-deference clause under which compliance with a comparable federal framework discharges the state obligation. States are deferring in advance to a federal standard that does not yet exist.</p><p>Outward and homeward movement build the US position; inward and downward movement defend it against interference, foreign in the former case and domestic in the latter. The same adversary-identity test recurs in an export control, a subsidy condition, and a screening review alike.</p>		=== Direction of Travel ===<p>Policy directionality is consistent across all four registers and runs four ways. Outward, the export programme pushes the domestic AI stack into third markets. Inward, the Data Security Program and Team Telecom review screen foreign access based on a counterparty's identity rather than the safeguards it offers. Homeward, subsidy builds domestic capacity. Downward, federal policy presses on the states, and it is working even though preemption ordinarily requires a congressional enactment: Colorado repealed its 2024 AI Act in May 2026 and replaced it with a narrower automated decision-making statute stripped of deployer impact-assessment duties, while California's frontier AI statute (SB 53) contains a federal-deference clause under which compliance with a comparable federal framework discharges the state obligation. States are deferring in advance to a federal standard that does not yet exist.</p><p>Outward and homeward movement build the US position; inward and downward movement defend it against interference, foreign in the former case and domestic in the latter. The same adversary-identity test recurs in an export control, a subsidy condition, and a screening review alike.</p>

	== US Infrastructure and Resources efforts for AI dominance ==		== US Infrastructure and Resources efforts for AI dominance ==
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	The United States aims to maintain its position in the [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/digital-disintegration-technoblocs-and-strategic-sovereignty-in-the-ai-era/DD86C6FD3FDD7FBBADEF100C6935D577 international order, seeking to surpass and constrain rival powers]. Technological dominance constitutes one of the principal means of pursuing this objective, and in recent years this pursuit has centred increasingly on artificial intelligence, a domain heavily dependent on underlying industrial capacity and resource access.		The United States aims to maintain its position in the [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/digital-disintegration-technoblocs-and-strategic-sovereignty-in-the-ai-era/DD86C6FD3FDD7FBBADEF100C6935D577 international order, seeking to surpass and constrain rival powers]. Technological dominance constitutes one of the principal means of pursuing this objective, and in recent years this pursuit has centred increasingly on artificial intelligence, a domain heavily dependent on underlying industrial capacity and resource access.

	Cloud service dependency describes a form of [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/susan-strange-meets-the-everyday-the-mundane-sources-of-structural-power/1D23361D622C523F7EB785EA54105858 structural power] exercised not through territorial control but through infrastructural ownership. Because US firms hold roughly [https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/european-cloud-providers-local-market-share-now-holds-steady-at-15 two-thirds of the EU cloud market], a majority of European data, public and private, resides within entities potentially subject to US jurisdiction, irrespective of the server's physical location. This constitutes strategic advantage precisely because it requires no conventional projection of power abroad: dominance is achieved by occupying the infrastructural layer itself, converting market position into jurisdictional reach and, in turn, translating informational access into epistemic and strategic advantage. The [https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/04/09/cloud_act.pdf CLOUD Act] grants the United States access to foreign data provided this is held by a US cloud service provider, access guaranteed only through a defined legal process, the issuance of a judicial warrant subject to probable cause. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a FISA Section 702], by contrast, authorises access to foreign data held in US clouds for intelligence purposes through compelled provider assistance, and in this instance no comparable judicial procedure is required by law. These divergent standards of authorisation, and the reach they enable, stand in direct tension with the protections EU law seeks to guarantee.		Cloud service dependency describes a form of [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/susan-strange-meets-the-everyday-the-mundane-sources-of-structural-power/1D23361D622C523F7EB785EA54105858 structural power] exercised not through territorial control but through infrastructural ownership. Because US firms hold roughly [https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/european-cloud-providers-local-market-share-now-holds-steady-at-15 two-thirds of the EU cloud market], a majority of European data, public and private, resides within entities potentially subject to US jurisdiction, irrespective of the server's physical location. This constitutes strategic advantage precisely because it requires no conventional projection of power abroad: dominance is achieved by occupying the infrastructural layer itself, converting market position into jurisdictional reach and, in turn, translating informational access into epistemic and strategic advantage. The [https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/04/09/cloud_act.pdf CLOUD Act] grants the United States access to foreign data provided this is held by a US cloud service provider, access guaranteed only through a defined legal process, the issuance of a judicial warrant subject to probable cause. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a FISA Section 702], by contrast, authorises access to foreign data held in US clouds for intelligence purposes through compelled provider assistance, and in this instance no comparable judicial procedure is required by law. These divergent standards of authorisation, and the reach they enable, stand in direct tension with the protections EU law seeks to guarantee.<p dir="auto">Ironically, the US maintains mechanisms to protect its data from foreign control while monitoring others’, consolidating digital sovereignty by setting the terms of engagement.</p>

	~~<p dir="auto">Ironically, the US maintains mechanisms to protect its data from foreign control while monitoring others’, consolidating digital sovereignty by setting the terms of engagement.</p>~~
	[https://www.fedramp.gov/ FedRAMP] establishes the conditions under which any cloud provider, including foreign entities, may process US federal government data, asserting sovereign gatekeeping over access to its own infrastructure even as it resists equivalent constraints abroad. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] and the accompanying [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31486/preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern DOJ rule (2025)], although criticised for their generalistic scope, restrict the outbound transfer of bulk sensitive data to designated "countries of concern." The asymmetry is instructive when set against the EU's broadly equivalent instruments: both regimes exercise control, but over opposite targets, the United States restricts flows to named adversaries, while the EU restricts flows to any third country whose legal framework it deems inadequate, a criterion of general application rather than one confined to a defined list of hostile states.		[https://www.fedramp.gov/ FedRAMP] establishes the conditions under which any cloud provider, including foreign entities, may process US federal government data, asserting sovereign gatekeeping over access to its own infrastructure even as it resists equivalent constraints abroad. [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04573/preventing-access-to-americans-bulk-sensitive-personal-data-and-united-states-government-related Executive Order 14117] and the accompanying [https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31486/preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern DOJ rule (2025)], although criticised for their generalistic scope, restrict the outbound transfer of bulk sensitive data to designated "countries of concern." The asymmetry is instructive when set against the EU's broadly equivalent instruments: both regimes exercise control, but over opposite targets, the United States restricts flows to named adversaries, while the EU restricts flows to any third country whose legal framework it deems inadequate, a criterion of general application rather than one confined to a defined list of hostile states.

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	CHIPS award recipients are also barred by law from using federal funds to pay shareholder dividends or buy back stock, a restriction the [https://www.nist.gov/document/approach-capital-allocation-policies CHIPS Program Office] has sought to extend for five years from the date of an award.		CHIPS award recipients are also barred by law from using federal funds to pay shareholder dividends or buy back stock, a restriction the [https://www.nist.gov/document/approach-capital-allocation-policies CHIPS Program Office] has sought to extend for five years from the date of an award.

	=== Supply Chain Management and Rare Earth Minerals ===		=== Supply Chain Management and Rare Earth Minerals ===<p class="mwt-heading">AI systems require advanced semiconductors, semiconductors require rare earth elements and critical minerals,  and the United States currently remains reliant on processing capacity concentrated in China. Where the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] addresses the fabrication layer, a separate and more fragmented body of law addresses the mineral layer beneath it. Unlike the EU's [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj/eng Critical Raw Materials Act], the American framework layers a foundational statute, an executive order, and a narrower defense-procurement statute.<br></p>
	<p class="mwt-heading">AI systems require advanced semiconductors, semiconductors require rare earth elements and critical minerals,  and the United States currently remains reliant on processing capacity concentrated in China. Where the [https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346 CHIPS and Science Act] addresses the fabrication layer, a separate and more fragmented body of law addresses the mineral layer beneath it. Unlike the EU's [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj/eng Critical Raw Materials Act], the American framework layers a foundational statute, an executive order, and a narrower defense-procurement statute.<br></p>

	==== Energy Act of 2020 ====		==== Energy Act of 2020 ====

Fortuny Jané Mariona: /* Supply Chain management and the Cloud */

2026-09-25T15:25:11Z

Supply Chain management and the Cloud

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:25, 25 September 2026
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	The EU's principal instrument of power has consequently been regulatory rather than infrastructural, expressed through the [https://gdpr-info.eu/art-48-gdpr/ GDPR (Art. 48)] and the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2854/oj/eng Data Act], mechanisms of constraint and protection rather than instruments of reach comparable to the [https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/04/09/cloud_act.pdf CLOUD Act] or [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a FISA]. There's a clear divergence in objective these reflect, and it is rooted in the different conception tof human rights, values and norms, related to data protection and privacy both actors have. Worth mentioning, the EU's position is further constrained by a material deficit, limited infrastructural capacity, financial resources.		The EU's principal instrument of power has consequently been regulatory rather than infrastructural, expressed through the [https://gdpr-info.eu/art-48-gdpr/ GDPR (Art. 48)] and the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2854/oj/eng Data Act], mechanisms of constraint and protection rather than instruments of reach comparable to the [https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2019/04/09/cloud_act.pdf CLOUD Act] or [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a FISA]. There's a clear divergence in objective these reflect, and it is rooted in the different conception tof human rights, values and norms, related to data protection and privacy both actors have. Worth mentioning, the EU's position is further constrained by a material deficit, limited infrastructural capacity, financial resources.

	As of right now, the United States can circumvent the normative safeguards the EU has imposed in some cases (through [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a FISA]), and it already possesses ~~the infrastructural capacity the EU lacks (~~[https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/european-cloud-providers-local-market-share-now-holds-steady-at-15 ~~only 13 to 15 percent of~~ the ~~market is~~ EU~~-owned~~]). This gives the US vast dominance in the field, which could be equated to what the EU coins as cloud sovereignty. Aware of the risks this dependency poses, both to data access and to the strategic advantage it affords the US, the EU has sought to reduce it through a succession of initiatives. [https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/eucs-cloud-service-scheme EUCS] was one such attempt, and remains only a non-legally-binding standard; whether the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52026PC0502 Cloud and AI Development Act] fares better remains to be seen.		As of right now, the United States can circumvent the normative safeguards the EU has imposed in some cases (through [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1881a FISA]), and it already possesses [https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/european-cloud-providers-local-market-share-now-holds-steady-at-15 the infrastructural capacity the EU lacks ]. This gives the US vast dominance in the field, which could be equated to what the EU coins as cloud sovereignty. Aware of the risks this dependency poses, both to data access and to the strategic advantage it affords the US, the EU has sought to reduce it through a succession of initiatives. [https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/eucs-cloud-service-scheme EUCS] was one such attempt, and remains only a non-legally-binding standard; whether the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52026PC0502 Cloud and AI Development Act] fares better remains to be seen.

	=== Supply Chain management and Semiconductors ===		=== Supply Chain management and Semiconductors ===