Module 3: Content - Revision history

JuliaGawłas at 15:18, 6 November 2025

2025-11-06T15:18:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:18, 6 November 2025
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	=== Brazil ===		=== Brazil ===
	<div>		<div>

	==== The Brazilian Context ====		==== The Brazilian Context ====

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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 1''' outlines the goals of the bill and definitions. </div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 1''' outlines the goals of the bill and definitions. </div>
	<div>		<div>

	*Bill aims to bolster the transparency of social networks, search engines, and instant messaging service providers.		*Bill aims to bolster the transparency of social networks, search engines, and instant messaging service providers.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*It applies to providers offering the aforementioned services in Brazil with over 10 million registered users.		*It applies to providers offering the aforementioned services in Brazil with over 10 million registered users.
	</div>		</div>
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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 2''' outlines the accountability obligations of those providers.</div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 2''' outlines the accountability obligations of those providers.</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 6'' requires all automated accounts to be identified as such to either the users or providers and for sponsored and automated content to be clearly defined to users.		*''Article 6'' requires all automated accounts to be identified as such to either the users or providers and for sponsored and automated content to be clearly defined to users.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Articles 9 and 10'' oblige providers to conduct half-yearly transparency reports focusing on the measures implemented to comply with the Bill’s applications, how many decisions taken pertaining to users were reverted after appeals, the systems used in content moderation, aggregated information on content which is ‘irregularly’ reaching greater audiences as identified by the provider, and the characteristics of the human content moderation team.		*''Articles 9 and 10'' oblige providers to conduct half-yearly transparency reports focusing on the measures implemented to comply with the Bill’s applications, how many decisions taken pertaining to users were reverted after appeals, the systems used in content moderation, aggregated information on content which is ‘irregularly’ reaching greater audiences as identified by the provider, and the characteristics of the human content moderation team.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 13'' empowers legal authorities to request messaging services to register and disclose user interactions for up to 60 days during an investigation.		*''Article 13'' empowers legal authorities to request messaging services to register and disclose user interactions for up to 60 days during an investigation.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 15'' obliges platforms to implement procedural rights for users when their content is moderated.		*''Article 15'' obliges platforms to implement procedural rights for users when their content is moderated.
	</div>		</div>
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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 3 '''introduces transparency criteria for boosted content and advertising with a specific focus on political advertising during electoral campaigns.</div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 3 '''introduces transparency criteria for boosted content and advertising with a specific focus on political advertising during electoral campaigns.</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 19'' requires providers to make public the amount spent by candidates and parties on online political advertising on their platforms, and other characteristics including the period of advertising circulation and general profiling categories of the targeted audience.		*''Article 19'' requires providers to make public the amount spent by candidates and parties on online political advertising on their platforms, and other characteristics including the period of advertising circulation and general profiling categories of the targeted audience.
	</div>		</div>
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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 4''' includes a specific regime to apply to platform accounts of public administration and office holders.</div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 4''' includes a specific regime to apply to platform accounts of public administration and office holders.</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*Article 22 stipulates that politicians cannot block either journalists or non-governmental organisations.		*Article 22 stipulates that politicians cannot block either journalists or non-governmental organisations.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*However, ‘parliamentary immunity’ is also extended to the content of the accounts, potentially protecting politicians from moderation decisions even if they participate in spreading false information.		*However, ‘parliamentary immunity’ is also extended to the content of the accounts, potentially protecting politicians from moderation decisions even if they participate in spreading false information.
	</div>		</div>
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	<div><br></div>		<div><br></div>
	<div>		<div>

	===== How does the Fake News Bill fit into other digital law in Brazil? =====		===== How does the Fake News Bill fit into other digital law in Brazil? =====
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	====== Setting the scene with MCI and LGPD ======		====== Setting the scene with MCI and LGPD ======
	</div>		</div>
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	<div><br></div>		<div><br></div>
	<div>		<div>

	===== Critique of the ‘Fake News’ Bill =====		===== Critique of the ‘Fake News’ Bill =====
	</div>		</div>
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	<div><br></div>		<div><br></div>
	<div>		<div>

	===== Current progress of the bill =====		===== Current progress of the bill =====
	</div>		</div>
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	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>
	<p class="p1">'''Soft Law Regulation '''</p>		<p class="p1">'''Soft Law Regulation '''</p>
	<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >Apart from misinformation and disinformation being addressed within legal regulatory frameworks, this matter has also been addressed in the form of soft law. Toolkits to combat the prevalence of and risks attached to misinformation have gained popularity within South Africa. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The department for Government Communications and Information Systems launched a toolkit in 2023 titled ‘Countering Misinformation and Disinformation’. This toolkit has 4 primary outcomes that it aims to achieve. As such, it aims to “(i) Identify a range of different types of misinformation, dis-information and malinformation, (ii) Prevent, contain, and tackle the spread of mis- and disinformation, (iii) Develop a response when mis- and disinformation affects the organisation’s/department’s ability to do its job or its reputation, or represents a threat to the general public, and (iv) Aid to build audience resilience to the threat of misinformation and disinformation”. Next it provides definitions for mis-, dis-, and malinformation. Accordingly information refers to verifiably false information that is shared with an intent to deceive and mislead, misinformation refers to verifiably false information that is shared without an intent to mislead, and malinformation deliberately misleads by twisting the meaning of truthful information. Thus, all three refer back to the presence of intent, of lack thereof. Therefore, the toolkit is based on the RESIST framework which is an acronym for Recognize, Early warning, Situational insight, Impact analysis, Strategic communications and Tackling effectiveness. This framework is essentially made to assist communicators and communications practitioners to monitor and choose appropriate responses in the cases of incorrect or misleading information. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The African Union Media Fellowship fellows have also created a more specific toolkit for journalists and content providers in the context of information connected to elections. The goal for it was to educate the target group on how to “verify information and report accurate news, before, during, and after elections”. This toolkit also provides definitions, however it provides for three extra ones referring to propaganda, clickbait and deepfakes. This toolkit is far more comprehensive as it provides for ways on tackling information disorder, however it also addresses the factors which contribute to the origination of information disorder, including social media, algorithmic biases, lack of media literacy and political polarisation. </span></p>		<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >Apart from misinformation and disinformation being addressed within legal regulatory frameworks, this matter has also been addressed in the form of soft law. Toolkits to combat the prevalence of and risks attached to misinformation have gained popularity within South Africa. </span></p>
	~~===~~ <~~span style~~="~~font-size: 10pt;~~" >Fake News Crisis~~: Covid 19 Pandemic~~ </~~span~~> ~~===~~		<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The department for Government Communications and Information Systems launched a toolkit in 2023 titled ‘Countering Misinformation and Disinformation’. This toolkit has 4 primary outcomes that it aims to achieve. As such, it aims to “(i) Identify a range of different types of misinformation, dis-information and malinformation, (ii) Prevent, contain, and tackle the spread of mis- and disinformation, (iii) Develop a response when mis- and disinformation affects the organisation’s/department’s ability to do its job or its reputation, or represents a threat to the general public, and (iv) Aid to build audience resilience to the threat of misinformation and disinformation”. Next it provides definitions for mis-, dis-, and malinformation. Accordingly information refers to verifiably false information that is shared with an intent to deceive and mislead, misinformation refers to verifiably false information that is shared without an intent to mislead, and malinformation deliberately misleads by twisting the meaning of truthful information. Thus, all three refer back to the presence of intent, of lack thereof. Therefore, the toolkit is based on the RESIST framework which is an acronym for Recognize, Early warning, Situational insight, Impact analysis, Strategic communications and Tackling effectiveness. This framework is essentially made to assist communicators and communications practitioners to monitor and choose appropriate responses in the cases of incorrect or misleading information. </span></p>
	<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The World Health Organization has coined the term ‘infodemic’ around the mass spread of fake news in South Africa during the Covid 19 pandemic. Large amounts of fake news were disseminated across the country, promoting various ideologies such as ‘African blood and black skin prevents COVID-19’, ‘Wearing a mask will make you sick’, ‘Authorities are inflating numbers of falsely confirming cases to benefit financially’. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The country has taken a variety of measures to address the spread of mis-, dis- and malinformation. For instance, the government has declared that anyone who “creates or spreads fake news about the Coronavirus COVID-19 is liable for prosecution”. Additionally, a website has been created for the reporting of fake news, and the government further assists by posting confirmed fake news onto the government website. However, while the spread of fake news became very prevalent, there was a lot of discourse in terms of the suppression of the freedom of expression, as the measures were claimed to be too vague and arbitrary. Ultimately, the South African regulators saw great urgency to combat harmful misinformation requiring quick intervention. </span></p></div>		<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The African Union Media Fellowship fellows have also created a more specific toolkit for journalists and content providers in the context of information connected to elections. The goal for it was to educate the target group on how to “verify information and report accurate news, before, during, and after elections”. This toolkit also provides definitions, however it provides for three extra ones referring to propaganda, clickbait and deepfakes. This toolkit is far more comprehensive as it provides for ways on tackling information disorder, however it also addresses the factors which contribute to the origination of information disorder, including social media, algorithmic biases, lack of media literacy and political polarisation. </span></p>
			<p class="p1">'''Fake News Crisis '''</p>
			<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The World Health Organization has coined the term ‘infodemic’ around the mass spread of fake news in South Africa during the Covid 19 pandemic. Large amounts of fake news were disseminated across the country, promoting various ideologies such as ‘African blood and black skin prevents COVID-19’, ‘Wearing a mask will make you sick’, ‘Authorities are inflating numbers of falsely confirming cases to benefit financially’. </span></p>
			<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;" >The country has taken a variety of measures to address the spread of mis-, dis- and malinformation. For instance, the government has declared that anyone who “creates or spreads fake news about the Coronavirus COVID-19 is liable for prosecution”. Additionally, a website has been created for the reporting of fake news, and the government further assists by posting confirmed fake news onto the government website. However, while the spread of fake news became very prevalent, there was a lot of discourse in terms of the suppression of the freedom of expression, as the measures were claimed to be too vague and arbitrary. Ultimately, the South African regulators saw great urgency to combat harmful misinformation requiring quick intervention. </span></p></div>

JuliaGawłas at 15:17, 6 November 2025

2025-11-06T15:17:10Z

Show changes

RomGoldwasser: /* South Africa */

2025-11-06T10:23:53Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:23, 6 November 2025
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	<p class="p1">South Africa regulates harmful online speech through targeted hard-law hooks rather than a general “anti-misinformation” statute. The system protects robust expression while carving out narrow, intent-based offences where democratic integrity or public safety is at stake, and it relies on sector codes to enforce day-to-day accuracy.There is no general statutory definition of “misinformation” or “disinformation” in South African law. Instead, speech is assessed through existing legal categories: constitutional carve-outs (war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and hate advocacy that constitutes incitement), election-period falsehoods with intent, cyber offences for incitement or threats via data messages, hate-speech offences, and professional accuracy duties for broadcasters and newsroom.</p>		<p class="p1">South Africa regulates harmful online speech through targeted hard-law hooks rather than a general “anti-misinformation” statute. The system protects robust expression while carving out narrow, intent-based offences where democratic integrity or public safety is at stake, and it relies on sector codes to enforce day-to-day accuracy.There is no general statutory definition of “misinformation” or “disinformation” in South African law. Instead, speech is assessed through existing legal categories: constitutional carve-outs (war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and hate advocacy that constitutes incitement), election-period falsehoods with intent, cyber offences for incitement or threats via data messages, hate-speech offences, and professional accuracy duties for broadcasters and newsroom.</p>

	<br><p class="p1">'''<span style="text-decoration: underline;"></span><span ~~style="text-decoration: underline;"~~>South Africa's Regulatory framework</span>'''~~</p>~~		<br><p class="p1">'''<span style="text-decoration: underline;"></span><span>South Africa's Regulatory framework</span>'''</p>
	~~<p class="p1"><br>~~</p>
	<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>		<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>		<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>

RomGoldwasser: /* South Africa */

2025-11-06T10:23:12Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:23, 6 November 2025
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	<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>		<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>		<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>
			<p class="p1">'''Election safeguards (Electoral Act)'''</p>
	~~<br>~~<p class="p1">'''Election safeguards (Electoral Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">During elections, section 89(2) of the [https://source.acts.co.za/electoral-act-1998/index.html?89__intentional_false_statements_.php Electoral Act] 73 of 1998 makes it an offence to publish false information with the intention of disrupting or preventing an election, creating hostility or fear to influence it, or otherwise influencing its conduct or outcome.</p>		<p class="p1">During elections, section 89(2) of the [https://source.acts.co.za/electoral-act-1998/index.html?89__intentional_false_statements_.php Electoral Act] 73 of 1998 makes it an offence to publish false information with the intention of disrupting or preventing an election, creating hostility or fear to influence it, or otherwise influencing its conduct or outcome.</p>
			<p class="p1">'''Code of Conduct for broadcasting (ICASA)'''</p>
	~~<br>~~<p class="p1">'''Code of Conduct for broadcasting (ICASA)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">Under regulation 10 (“News”) of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa ICASA [https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/32381958.pdf Code of Conduct Regulations] for broadcasting service licensees, news must be reported truthfully, accurately and fairly, with no intentional or negligent departures from fact (including distortion or material omissions).</p>		<p class="p1">Under regulation 10 (“News”) of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa ICASA [https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/32381958.pdf Code of Conduct Regulations] for broadcasting service licensees, news must be reported truthfully, accurately and fairly, with no intentional or negligent departures from fact (including distortion or material omissions).</p>
			<p class="p1">'''Online safeguards (Cybercrimes Act)'''</p>
	~~<br>~~<p class="p1">'''Online safeguards (Cybercrimes Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/cybercrimes-act-19-2020-english-afrikaans-01-jun-2021 The Cybercrimes Act ]19 of 2020 targets harmful effects of digital speech rather than truth per se. Section 14 criminalises disclosing a data message with the intention to incite violence or damage to property; section 15 separately criminalises threat messages. Courts may order takedown or disabling of access. These offences focus on the effects and intent of online distribution rather than its truth value.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/cybercrimes-act-19-2020-english-afrikaans-01-jun-2021 The Cybercrimes Act ]19 of 2020 targets harmful effects of digital speech rather than truth per se. Section 14 criminalises disclosing a data message with the intention to incite violence or damage to property; section 15 separately criminalises threat messages. Courts may order takedown or disabling of access. These offences focus on the effects and intent of online distribution rather than its truth value.</p>
	~~<p class="p1">''''''</p>~~
	<p class="p1">'''Hate-speech prohibition (Hate-Speech Act)'''</p>		<p class="p1">'''Hate-speech prohibition (Hate-Speech Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202405/50652preventionandcombatingofhatecrimesandhatespeech162023.pdf The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act] 16 of 2023, section 4(1), creates a stand-alone hate-speech offence, requiring intentional communication with a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred on protected grounds, with specified exemption.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202405/50652preventionandcombatingofhatecrimesandhatespeech162023.pdf The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act] 16 of 2023, section 4(1), creates a stand-alone hate-speech offence, requiring intentional communication with a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred on protected grounds, with specified exemption.</p>
			<p class="p1">'''Codification of prohibited content (Films & Publications Act)'''</p>
	~~<br>~~<p class="p1">'''Codification of prohibited content (Films & Publications Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>

RomGoldwasser: /* South Africa */

2025-11-06T10:21:51Z

South Africa

RomGoldwasser: /* South Africa */

2025-11-06T10:20:41Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:20, 6 November 2025
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	*[http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ng-interactive/2019/jun/22/the-rise-of-the-deepfake-and-the-threat-to-democracy Texas law] (and California law until 2022) prohibits distribution of election-related “deepfakes,” which use artificial intelligence to create highly realistic videos that appear to portray real people when they do not.		*[http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ng-interactive/2019/jun/22/the-rise-of-the-deepfake-and-the-threat-to-democracy Texas law] (and California law until 2022) prohibits distribution of election-related “deepfakes,” which use artificial intelligence to create highly realistic videos that appear to portray real people when they do not.

	=== South Africa~~<br>~~ ===		=== South Africa ===

	<p class="p1">South Africa regulates harmful online speech through targeted hard-law hooks rather than a general “anti-misinformation” statute. The system protects robust expression while carving out narrow, intent-based offences where democratic integrity or public safety is at stake, and it relies on sector codes to enforce day-to-day accuracy.</p>		<p class="p1">'''Definitions'''</p>
			<p class="p1">South Africa regulates harmful online speech through targeted hard-law hooks rather than a general “anti-misinformation” statute. The system protects robust expression while carving out narrow, intent-based offences where democratic integrity or public safety is at stake, and it relies on sector codes to enforce day-to-day accuracy.There is no general statutory definition of “misinformation” or “disinformation” in South African law. Instead, speech is assessed through existing legal categories: constitutional carve-outs (war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and hate advocacy that constitutes incitement), election-period falsehoods with intent, cyber offences for incitement or threats via data messages, hate-speech offences, and professional accuracy duties for broadcasters and newsroom.</p>

	<br><p class="p1">~~'''Definitions~~'''<~~/p>~~		<br><p class="p1">'''<span style="text-decoration: underline;"></span><span style="text-decoration: underline;" >South Africa's Regulatory framework</span>'''</p>
	~~<p class~~="p1">There is no general statutory definition of “misinformation” or “disinformation” in South African law. Instead, speech is assessed through existing legal categories: constitutional carve-outs (war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and hate advocacy that constitutes incitement), election-period falsehoods with intent, cyber offences for incitement or threats via data messages, hate-speech offences, and professional accuracy duties for broadcasters and newsroom.</p>		<p class="p1">''''''</p>

	~~<br><p class="p1">'''~~<span style="text-decoration: underline;" ~~></span~~>South Africa's Regulatory framework'''</p>
	<p class="p1"></p>
	<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>		<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>		<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>
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	<br><p class="p1">'''Online safeguards (Cybercrimes Act)'''</p>		<br><p class="p1">'''Online safeguards (Cybercrimes Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/cybercrimes-act-19-2020-english-afrikaans-01-jun-2021 The Cybercrimes Act ]19 of 2020 targets harmful effects of digital speech rather than truth per se. Section 14 criminalises disclosing a data message with the intention to incite violence or damage to property; section 15 separately criminalises threat messages. Courts may order takedown or disabling of access. These offences focus on the effects and intent of online distribution rather than its truth value.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/cybercrimes-act-19-2020-english-afrikaans-01-jun-2021 The Cybercrimes Act ]19 of 2020 targets harmful effects of digital speech rather than truth per se. Section 14 criminalises disclosing a data message with the intention to incite violence or damage to property; section 15 separately criminalises threat messages. Courts may order takedown or disabling of access. These offences focus on the effects and intent of online distribution rather than its truth value.</p>
	<br>~~''''''~~<p class="p1">~~''''''~~'''Hate-speech prohibition (Hate-Speech Act)'''</p>		<p class="p1"></p>
			<p class="p1">'''Hate-speech prohibition (Hate-Speech Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">'''[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202405/50652preventionandcombatingofhatecrimesandhatespeech162023.pdf The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act] '''16 of 2023, section 4(1), creates a stand-alone hate-speech offence, requiring intentional communication with a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred on protected grounds, with specified exemption.</p>		<p class="p1">'''[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202405/50652preventionandcombatingofhatecrimesandhatespeech162023.pdf The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act] '''16 of 2023, section 4(1), creates a stand-alone hate-speech offence, requiring intentional communication with a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred on protected grounds, with specified exemption.</p>

	<br><p class="p1">'''Codification of prohibited content (Films & Publications Act)'''</p>		<br><p class="p1">'''Codification of prohibited content (Films & Publications Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>

RomGoldwasser: /* South Africa */

2025-11-06T10:18:52Z

South Africa

@@ Line 342: / Line 342: @@
 *[http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ng-interactive/2019/jun/22/the-rise-of-the-deepfake-and-the-threat-to-democracy Texas law] (and California law until 2022) prohibits distribution of election-related “deepfakes,” which use artificial intelligence to create highly realistic videos that appear to portray real people when they do not.
-=== South Africa ===
+=== South Africa<br> ===
-</div>

Plixavra: /* The Brazilian Context */

2025-11-04T07:56:31Z

The Brazilian Context

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:56, 4 November 2025
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	=== Brazil ===		=== Brazil ===
	<div>		<div>
	==== ~~'''~~The Brazilian ~~Context'''~~ ====		==== The Brazilian Context ====

	<div>The Brazilian 2018 presidential elections brought the spotlight onto issues of disinformation into the policy debate due to the use of disinformation in Jair Bolsanaro’s campaign. A key aspect of efforts to fight disinformation and the design of policy bills centers around the use of messaging services, primarily [https://www.terra.com.br/byte/no-telegram-golpistas-falavam-de-invasao-ao-congresso-desde-comeco-de-janeiro,eb32e7542879048f48c82e0f30aa4414av9dzxap.html Telegram] and [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231160632 WhatsApp][https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231160632 , to spread disinformation during] the presidential elections. Due to the fact that the rates of sending traditional (‘SMS’) messages in Brazil were unaffordable and very expensive for the majority of people in Brazil, the web-based [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3618781 WhatsApp offered] a less expensive alternative. The feature that stood out in these messaging apps in particular was the ability to make large-scale messaging chains, which became a prime social-media instrument for targeted political disinformation campaigns in Brazil. Consequently, it was noted that Bolsonaro’s supporters often preyed on Brazil’s ‘poor,’ to gain a voting base in [https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2281&context=lj disadvantaged communities]. These WhatsApp-led disinformation campaigns, which later led to the surrounding discussion on disinformation regulation in Brazil, culminated in an [https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/09/americas/brazil-congress-attack-explained-intl/index.html attack on the Brazilian Congress] by supporters of Bolsanaro after his loss, reminiscent of the January 6 Capitol attack in the United States.		<div>The Brazilian 2018 presidential elections brought the spotlight onto issues of disinformation into the policy debate due to the use of disinformation in Jair Bolsanaro’s campaign. A key aspect of efforts to fight disinformation and the design of policy bills centers around the use of messaging services, primarily [https://www.terra.com.br/byte/no-telegram-golpistas-falavam-de-invasao-ao-congresso-desde-comeco-de-janeiro,eb32e7542879048f48c82e0f30aa4414av9dzxap.html Telegram] and [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231160632 WhatsApp][https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231160632 , to spread disinformation during] the presidential elections. Due to the fact that the rates of sending traditional (‘SMS’) messages in Brazil were unaffordable and very expensive for the majority of people in Brazil, the web-based [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3618781 WhatsApp offered] a less expensive alternative. The feature that stood out in these messaging apps in particular was the ability to make large-scale messaging chains, which became a prime social-media instrument for targeted political disinformation campaigns in Brazil. Consequently, it was noted that Bolsonaro’s supporters often preyed on Brazil’s ‘poor,’ to gain a voting base in [https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2281&context=lj disadvantaged communities]. These WhatsApp-led disinformation campaigns, which later led to the surrounding discussion on disinformation regulation in Brazil, culminated in an [https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/09/americas/brazil-congress-attack-explained-intl/index.html attack on the Brazilian Congress] by supporters of Bolsanaro after his loss, reminiscent of the January 6 Capitol attack in the United States.

Plixavra: /* Misinformation and Disinformation Online */

2025-11-04T07:56:06Z

Misinformation and Disinformation Online

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:56, 4 November 2025
Line 42:		Line 42:
	<p>Two recent and extremely prevalent use cases of disinformation influencing elections, namely the Brexit Referendum in the UK and the US Elections of 2016, are the Cambridge Analytica ones. Data improperly obtained on close to 90m Facebook users were used to target users and voters online with ads and opinion-forming information to [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/637952/EPRS_ATA(2019)637952_EN.pdf manipulate behaviour, for the purpose of influencing the voting for the respective polls]. </p>		<p>Two recent and extremely prevalent use cases of disinformation influencing elections, namely the Brexit Referendum in the UK and the US Elections of 2016, are the Cambridge Analytica ones. Data improperly obtained on close to 90m Facebook users were used to target users and voters online with ads and opinion-forming information to [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/637952/EPRS_ATA(2019)637952_EN.pdf manipulate behaviour, for the purpose of influencing the voting for the respective polls]. </p>
	<p>An [https://rahwebdav.swan.ac.uk/repec/pdf/wp2018-01.pdf evaluation of Twitter [now X] data on the Brexit Referendum and the US elections], suggests that “the aggressive use of Twitter bots, [...] could [also] contribute to the vote outcomes.”</p>		<p>An [https://rahwebdav.swan.ac.uk/repec/pdf/wp2018-01.pdf evaluation of Twitter [now X] data on the Brexit Referendum and the US elections], suggests that “the aggressive use of Twitter bots, [...] could [also] contribute to the vote outcomes.”</p>

	~~=== ===~~

	=== Brazil ===		=== Brazil ===
	<div>		<div>

	==== '''The Brazilian Context''' ====		==== '''The Brazilian Context''' ====

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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 1''' outlines the goals of the bill and definitions. </div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 1''' outlines the goals of the bill and definitions. </div>
	<div>		<div>

	*Bill aims to bolster the transparency of social networks, search engines, and instant messaging service providers.		*Bill aims to bolster the transparency of social networks, search engines, and instant messaging service providers.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*It applies to providers offering the aforementioned services in Brazil with over 10 million registered users.		*It applies to providers offering the aforementioned services in Brazil with over 10 million registered users.
	</div>		</div>
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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 2''' outlines the accountability obligations of those providers.</div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 2''' outlines the accountability obligations of those providers.</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 6'' requires all automated accounts to be identified as such to either the users or providers and for sponsored and automated content to be clearly defined to users.		*''Article 6'' requires all automated accounts to be identified as such to either the users or providers and for sponsored and automated content to be clearly defined to users.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Articles 9 and 10'' oblige providers to conduct half-yearly transparency reports focusing on the measures implemented to comply with the Bill’s applications, how many decisions taken pertaining to users were reverted after appeals, the systems used in content moderation, aggregated information on content which is ‘irregularly’ reaching greater audiences as identified by the provider, and the characteristics of the human content moderation team.		*''Articles 9 and 10'' oblige providers to conduct half-yearly transparency reports focusing on the measures implemented to comply with the Bill’s applications, how many decisions taken pertaining to users were reverted after appeals, the systems used in content moderation, aggregated information on content which is ‘irregularly’ reaching greater audiences as identified by the provider, and the characteristics of the human content moderation team.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 13'' empowers legal authorities to request messaging services to register and disclose user interactions for up to 60 days during an investigation.		*''Article 13'' empowers legal authorities to request messaging services to register and disclose user interactions for up to 60 days during an investigation.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 15'' obliges platforms to implement procedural rights for users when their content is moderated.		*''Article 15'' obliges platforms to implement procedural rights for users when their content is moderated.
	</div>		</div>
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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 3 '''introduces transparency criteria for boosted content and advertising with a specific focus on political advertising during electoral campaigns.</div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 3 '''introduces transparency criteria for boosted content and advertising with a specific focus on political advertising during electoral campaigns.</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*''Article 19'' requires providers to make public the amount spent by candidates and parties on online political advertising on their platforms, and other characteristics including the period of advertising circulation and general profiling categories of the targeted audience.		*''Article 19'' requires providers to make public the amount spent by candidates and parties on online political advertising on their platforms, and other characteristics including the period of advertising circulation and general profiling categories of the targeted audience.
	</div>		</div>
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	\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 4''' includes a specific regime to apply to platform accounts of public administration and office holders.</div>		\| style="width: 100%;" \| <div>'''Chapter 4''' includes a specific regime to apply to platform accounts of public administration and office holders.</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*Article 22 stipulates that politicians cannot block either journalists or non-governmental organisations.		*Article 22 stipulates that politicians cannot block either journalists or non-governmental organisations.
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	*However, ‘parliamentary immunity’ is also extended to the content of the accounts, potentially protecting politicians from moderation decisions even if they participate in spreading false information.		*However, ‘parliamentary immunity’ is also extended to the content of the accounts, potentially protecting politicians from moderation decisions even if they participate in spreading false information.
	</div>		</div>
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	<div><br></div>		<div><br></div>
	<div>		<div>

	===== How does the Fake News Bill fit into other digital law in Brazil? =====		===== How does the Fake News Bill fit into other digital law in Brazil? =====
	</div>		</div>
	<div>		<div>

	====== Setting the scene with MCI and LGPD ======		====== Setting the scene with MCI and LGPD ======
	</div>		</div>
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	<div><br></div>		<div><br></div>
	<div>		<div>

	===== Critique of the ‘Fake News’ Bill =====		===== Critique of the ‘Fake News’ Bill =====
	</div>		</div>
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	<div><br></div>		<div><br></div>
	<div>		<div>

	===== Current progress of the bill =====		===== Current progress of the bill =====
	</div>		</div>

RomGoldwasser: Undo revision 123477 by RomGoldwasser (talk)

2025-10-30T21:36:42Z

Undo revision 123477 by RomGoldwasser (talk)

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:36, 30 October 2025
Line 332:		Line 332:
	*[http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ng-interactive/2019/jun/22/the-rise-of-the-deepfake-and-the-threat-to-democracy Texas law] (and California law until 2022) prohibits distribution of election-related “deepfakes,” which use artificial intelligence to create highly realistic videos that appear to portray real people when they do not.		*[http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ng-interactive/2019/jun/22/the-rise-of-the-deepfake-and-the-threat-to-democracy Texas law] (and California law until 2022) prohibits distribution of election-related “deepfakes,” which use artificial intelligence to create highly realistic videos that appear to portray real people when they do not.

	=== South Africa~~<br>~~ ===		=== South Africa ===
			</div>
	~~== '''South Africa’s Regulatory Framework'''~~<br><br>South Africa regulates harmful online speech through sector specific rules rather than a general “anti-misinformation” statute. The framework protects robust expression while carving out narrow, intent-based offences where democratic integrity or public safety is at stake. Section 16 (1) of [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf South Africa’s Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression yet excludes three categories (section 16 (2)): propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. Those exclusions are the anchors that let Parliament criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.<br><br>South Africa's regulatory framework adresses harmful speech directly in the following context. First, around elections, the legislature adds a targeted brake via [https://source.acts.co.za/electoral-act-1998/index.html?89__intentional_false_statements_.php Section 89 (2) of the Electoral Act (Act No.73 of 1998)], which makes it an offence to publish false information with the intention of disrupting or preventing an election, creating hostility or fear to influence it, or otherwise influencing its conduct or outcome. Second, Article 10 of The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) [https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/32381958.pdf Code of Conduct Regulations] for broadcasting service licensees, requires that news be reported truthfully, accurately and fairly, with no intentional or negligent departures from fact. ==
	~~== '''Online Safeguards ''' ==~~
	== [https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/cybercrimes-act-19-2020-english-afrikaans-01-jun-2021 The Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020] targets harmful effects of digital speech rather than dis/misinformation per se. Section 14 criminalises disclosing a data message with the intention to incite violence or damage to property, while section 15 separately criminalises threat messages. Courts may order takedown or disablement. ==

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:21, 6 November 2025
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	<p class="p1">South Africa regulates harmful online speech through targeted hard-law hooks rather than a general “anti-misinformation” statute. The system protects robust expression while carving out narrow, intent-based offences where democratic integrity or public safety is at stake, and it relies on sector codes to enforce day-to-day accuracy.There is no general statutory definition of “misinformation” or “disinformation” in South African law. Instead, speech is assessed through existing legal categories: constitutional carve-outs (war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and hate advocacy that constitutes incitement), election-period falsehoods with intent, cyber offences for incitement or threats via data messages, hate-speech offences, and professional accuracy duties for broadcasters and newsroom.</p>		<p class="p1">South Africa regulates harmful online speech through targeted hard-law hooks rather than a general “anti-misinformation” statute. The system protects robust expression while carving out narrow, intent-based offences where democratic integrity or public safety is at stake, and it relies on sector codes to enforce day-to-day accuracy.There is no general statutory definition of “misinformation” or “disinformation” in South African law. Instead, speech is assessed through existing legal categories: constitutional carve-outs (war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and hate advocacy that constitutes incitement), election-period falsehoods with intent, cyber offences for incitement or threats via data messages, hate-speech offences, and professional accuracy duties for broadcasters and newsroom.</p>

	<br><p class="p1">'''<span style="text-decoration: underline;"></span><span style="text-decoration: underline;" >South Africa's Regulatory framework</span>'''</p>		<br><p class="p1">'''<span style="text-decoration: underline;"></span><span style="text-decoration: underline;">South Africa's Regulatory framework</span>'''</p>
	<p class="p1">~~''''''~~</p>		<p class="p1"><br></p>
	<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>		<p class="p1">'''Right to freedom of expression and carve-outs (legal baseline)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>		<p class="p1">Section 16(1) of the South Africa's [https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf Constitution] guarantees freedom of expression; section 16(2) excludes three categories: propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred based on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to cause harm. These exclusions anchor Parliament’s power to criminalise or otherwise regulate dangerous speech without infringing protected expression.</p>
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	<br><p class="p1">'''Online safeguards (Cybercrimes Act)'''</p>		<br><p class="p1">'''Online safeguards (Cybercrimes Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/cybercrimes-act-19-2020-english-afrikaans-01-jun-2021 The Cybercrimes Act ]19 of 2020 targets harmful effects of digital speech rather than truth per se. Section 14 criminalises disclosing a data message with the intention to incite violence or damage to property; section 15 separately criminalises threat messages. Courts may order takedown or disabling of access. These offences focus on the effects and intent of online distribution rather than its truth value.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/cybercrimes-act-19-2020-english-afrikaans-01-jun-2021 The Cybercrimes Act ]19 of 2020 targets harmful effects of digital speech rather than truth per se. Section 14 criminalises disclosing a data message with the intention to incite violence or damage to property; section 15 separately criminalises threat messages. Courts may order takedown or disabling of access. These offences focus on the effects and intent of online distribution rather than its truth value.</p>
	<p class="p1"></p>		<p class="p1">''''''</p>
	<p class="p1">'''Hate-speech prohibition (Hate-Speech Act)'''</p>		<p class="p1">'''Hate-speech prohibition (Hate-Speech Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">~~'''~~[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202405/50652preventionandcombatingofhatecrimesandhatespeech162023.pdf The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act] ~~'''~~16 of 2023, section 4(1), creates a stand-alone hate-speech offence, requiring intentional communication with a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred on protected grounds, with specified exemption.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202405/50652preventionandcombatingofhatecrimesandhatespeech162023.pdf The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act] 16 of 2023, section 4(1), creates a stand-alone hate-speech offence, requiring intentional communication with a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred on protected grounds, with specified exemption.</p>

	<br><p class="p1">'''Codification of prohibited content (Films & Publications Act)'''</p>		<br><p class="p1">'''Codification of prohibited content (Films & Publications Act)'''</p>
	<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>		<p class="p1">[https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202403/50311gon4526.pdf The Films & Publications Act 65 of 1996] (FPA) codifies “prohibited content” in line with section 16(2) of the Constitution. Section 18H bans distributing content that is propaganda for war, incites imminent violence, or advocates hatred constituting incitement. The FPA does not criminalise mis/disinformation as such; it becomes relevant only when false or manipulative content crosses these thresholds.</p>