Module 4: Power - Revision history

Plixavra: /* Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa */

2025-11-28T11:19:24Z

Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:19, 28 November 2025
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	<p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which [https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ] describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>		<p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which [https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ] describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>
	''''''		''''''
	==== Outlook, recommendations~~, and how to get it right for South Africa~~ ====		==== Outlook and recommendations ====
	<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>		<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>
	[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5562298 Yolani Ndamase] outlines the shortcomings of borrowing from other legislations.		[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5562298 Yolani Ndamase] outlines the shortcomings of borrowing from other legislations.

NadineWalsh: /* Inquiries and Preliminary Report */

2025-11-26T18:50:59Z

Inquiries and Preliminary Report

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:50, 26 November 2025
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	<p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Competition-Law-in-uncertain-times-The-rise-of-Digitalization.pdf conduct]. </p>		<p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Competition-Law-in-uncertain-times-The-rise-of-Digitalization.pdf conduct]. </p>

	==== ~~'''~~Inquiries and Preliminary Report ~~'''~~ ====		==== Inquiries and Preliminary Report ====
	<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p><p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>		<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p>
			<p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>

	==== African Union Protocol ====		==== African Union Protocol ====
	<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>		<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>

NadineWalsh: /* Competition Act */

2025-11-26T18:50:41Z

Competition Act

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:50, 26 November 2025
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	Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.		Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.
	=== South Africa ===		=== South Africa ===
	==== ~~'''~~Competition Act~~'''~~ ====		==== Competition Act ====
	<p>When considering the regulation of platform power in South Africa, currently the only legally binding act applicable is the 1998 [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Competition-Act-A6.pdf Competition Act]. </p><p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Competition-Law-in-uncertain-times-The-rise-of-Digitalization.pdf conduct]. </p>		<p>When considering the regulation of platform power in South Africa, currently the only legally binding act applicable is the 1998 [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Competition-Act-A6.pdf Competition Act]. </p>
			<p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Competition-Law-in-uncertain-times-The-rise-of-Digitalization.pdf conduct]. </p>

	==== '''Inquiries and Preliminary Report ''' ====		==== '''Inquiries and Preliminary Report ''' ====
	<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p><p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>		<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p><p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>

NadineWalsh: /* African Union Protocol */

2025-11-26T18:50:08Z

African Union Protocol

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:50, 26 November 2025
Line 299:		Line 299:
	==== '''Inquiries and Preliminary Report ''' ====		==== '''Inquiries and Preliminary Report ''' ====
	<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p><p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>		<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p><p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>
	==== ~~'''~~African Union Protocol~~'''~~ ====		==== African Union Protocol ====
	<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p><p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf key aims of the protocol] are to provide for an “integrated and unified African continental competition” and “manage the interrelationships of competition regimes and sectoral regulatory laws at the national, regional, and continental levels”. It borrows the terminology of ‘gatekeeper’ from DMA.</p>		<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>
			<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf key aims of the protocol] are to provide for an “integrated and unified African continental competition” and “manage the interrelationships of competition regimes and sectoral regulatory laws at the national, regional, and continental levels”. It borrows the terminology of ‘gatekeeper’ from DMA.</p>
	[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Part II of the Protocol] outlines the anti-competitive business practices and conduct being “incompatible with the proper functioning of the Market”, such as collusion, abuse of a dominant position, mergers and acquisitions preventing market competition, price fixing, and bid-rigging among others.<p>It is [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf prohibited for an undertaking or a group of undertakings or gatekeepers] to abuse the relative position of economic dependence over a customer or supplier if the conduct substantially affects the functioning and structure of competition in the market.</p><p>The [https://static.pmg.org.za/250903_Ratification_AfCFTA_Protocols.pdf latest status on the ratification process of the protocol] at the time of writing, was that it has not yet been signed by the required 23 or more member states and is therefore not yet in force.</p>		[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Part II of the Protocol] outlines the anti-competitive business practices and conduct being “incompatible with the proper functioning of the Market”, such as collusion, abuse of a dominant position, mergers and acquisitions preventing market competition, price fixing, and bid-rigging among others.<p>It is [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf prohibited for an undertaking or a group of undertakings or gatekeepers] to abuse the relative position of economic dependence over a customer or supplier if the conduct substantially affects the functioning and structure of competition in the market.</p>
			<p>The [https://static.pmg.org.za/250903_Ratification_AfCFTA_Protocols.pdf latest status on the ratification process of the protocol] at the time of writing, was that it has not yet been signed by the required 23 or more member states and is therefore not yet in force.</p>
	==== ~~'''~~Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness~~'''~~ ====<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p><p>Bauer and Pandya argue however that the adoption of the essence of foreign regulations, namely the EU’s DMAt is a marked shift away from the “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. principles of traditional competition regulation]”. </p><p>A criticism of the market inquiry approach is the identification of market leaders as competitive distortion. What is missing however to substantiate this claim, are the formal findings of dominance. Where the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng DMA outlines prerequisites] to be established as dominant (i.e. annual turnover, market capitalisation, active (business) users), this is absent in the inquiry. </p><p>A further criticism of relying on the EU regulation or any other as they were, is a way to regulate for “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits]”. </p><p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which [https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ] describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>		''''''
			==== Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness ====
	==== ~~'''~~Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa~~'''~~ ====<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>		<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p>
			<p>Bauer and Pandya argue however that the adoption of the essence of foreign regulations, namely the EU’s DMAt is a marked shift away from the “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. principles of traditional competition regulation]”. </p>
			<p>A criticism of the market inquiry approach is the identification of market leaders as competitive distortion. What is missing however to substantiate this claim, are the formal findings of dominance. Where the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng DMA outlines prerequisites] to be established as dominant (i.e. annual turnover, market capitalisation, active (business) users), this is absent in the inquiry. </p>
			<p>A further criticism of relying on the EU regulation or any other as they were, is a way to regulate for “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits]”. </p>
			<p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which [https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ] describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>
			''''''
			==== Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa ====
			<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>
	[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5562298 Yolani Ndamase] outlines the shortcomings of borrowing from other legislations.		[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5562298 Yolani Ndamase] outlines the shortcomings of borrowing from other legislations.

NadineWalsh: /* South Africa */

2025-11-19T15:04:10Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:04, 19 November 2025
Line 295:		Line 295:
	Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.		Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.
	=== South Africa ===		=== South Africa ===
	~~<h4 class~~=~~"mwt-heading" >~~'''Competition Act'''~~</h4>~~		==== '''Competition Act''' ====
	<p>When considering the regulation of platform power in South Africa, currently the only legally binding act applicable is the 1998 [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Competition-Act-A6.pdf Competition Act]. </p>		<p>When considering the regulation of platform power in South Africa, currently the only legally binding act applicable is the 1998 [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Competition-Act-A6.pdf Competition Act]. </p><p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Competition-Law-in-uncertain-times-The-rise-of-Digitalization.pdf conduct]. </p>
	<p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Competition-Law-in-uncertain-times-The-rise-of-Digitalization.pdf conduct]. </p>		==== '''Inquiries and Preliminary Report ''' ====
	~~<h4 class~~=~~"mwt-heading" >~~'''Inquiries and Preliminary ~~Report ~~'''~~</h4>~~		<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p><p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>
	<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p>		==== '''African Union Protocol''' ====
	<p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>		<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p><p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf key aims of the protocol] are to provide for an “integrated and unified African continental competition” and “manage the interrelationships of competition regimes and sectoral regulatory laws at the national, regional, and continental levels”. It borrows the terminology of ‘gatekeeper’ from DMA.</p>
	~~<p>~~'''African Union Protocol'''~~</p>~~
	<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>
	<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf key aims of the protocol] are to provide for an “integrated and unified African continental competition” and “manage the interrelationships of competition regimes and sectoral regulatory laws at the national, regional, and continental levels”. It borrows the terminology of ‘gatekeeper’ from DMA~~.</p>~~
	[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Part II of the Protocol] outlines the anti-competitive business practices and conduct being “incompatible with the proper functioning of the Market”, such as collusion, abuse of a dominant position, mergers and acquisitions preventing market competition, price fixing, and bid-rigging among others.<p>It is [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf prohibited for an undertaking or a group of undertakings or gatekeepers] to abuse the relative position of economic dependence over a customer or supplier if the conduct substantially affects the functioning and structure of competition in the market.</p>
	<p>The [https://static.pmg.org.za/250903_Ratification_AfCFTA_Protocols.pdf latest status on the ratification process of the protocol] at the time of writing, was that it has not yet been signed by the required 23 or more member states and is therefore not yet in force.</p>

	==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====		[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Part II of the Protocol] outlines the anti-competitive business practices and conduct being “incompatible with the proper functioning of the Market”, such as collusion, abuse of a dominant position, mergers and acquisitions preventing market competition, price fixing, and bid-rigging among others.<p>It is [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf prohibited for an undertaking or a group of undertakings or gatekeepers] to abuse the relative position of economic dependence over a customer or supplier if the conduct substantially affects the functioning and structure of competition in the market.</p><p>The [https://static.pmg.org.za/250903_Ratification_AfCFTA_Protocols.pdf latest status on the ratification process of the protocol] at the time of writing, was that it has not yet been signed by the required 23 or more member states and is therefore not yet in force.</p>
	<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p>
	<p>Bauer and Pandya argue however that the adoption of the essence of foreign regulations, namely the EU’s DMAt is a marked shift away from the “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. principles of traditional competition regulation]”. </p>		==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p><p>Bauer and Pandya argue however that the adoption of the essence of foreign regulations, namely the EU’s DMAt is a marked shift away from the “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. principles of traditional competition regulation]”. </p><p>A criticism of the market inquiry approach is the identification of market leaders as competitive distortion. What is missing however to substantiate this claim, are the formal findings of dominance. Where the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng DMA outlines prerequisites] to be established as dominant (i.e. annual turnover, market capitalisation, active (business) users), this is absent in the inquiry. </p><p>A further criticism of relying on the EU regulation or any other as they were, is a way to regulate for “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits]”. </p><p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which [https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ] describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>
	<p>A criticism of the market inquiry approach is the identification of market leaders as competitive distortion. What is missing however to substantiate this claim, are the formal findings of dominance. Where the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng DMA outlines prerequisites] to be established as dominant (i.e. annual turnover, market capitalisation, active (business) users), this is absent in the inquiry. </p>
	<p>A further criticism of relying on the EU regulation or any other as they were, is a way to regulate for “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits]”. </p>		==== '''Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa''' ====<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>
	<p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which [https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ] describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>

	~~==== '''Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa''' ====~~
	~~<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>~~
	[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5562298 Yolani Ndamase] outlines the shortcomings of borrowing from other legislations.		[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5562298 Yolani Ndamase] outlines the shortcomings of borrowing from other legislations.

JuliaGawłas: /* South Africa */

2025-11-19T10:36:09Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:36, 19 November 2025
Line 295:		Line 295:
	Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.		Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.
	=== South Africa ===		=== South Africa ===
	<p>'''Competition Act'''</p>		<h4 class="mwt-heading" >'''Competition Act'''</h4>
	<p>When considering the regulation of platform power in South Africa, currently the only legally binding act applicable is the 1998 Competition Act. </p>		<p>When considering the regulation of platform power in South Africa, currently the only legally binding act applicable is the 1998 [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Competition-Act-A6.pdf Competition Act]. </p>
	<p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive conduct. </p>		<p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Competition-Law-in-uncertain-times-The-rise-of-Digitalization.pdf conduct]. </p>
			<h4 class="mwt-heading" >'''Inquiries and Preliminary Report '''</h4>
	<p>'''Inquiries and Preliminary Report '''</p>		<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged [https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/ccpb_IGECOM2024_contribution_digital_markets_SA_en_0.pdf persons] (HDP). </p>
	<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged persons (HDP). ~~</p>~~		<p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the [https://www.compcom.co.za/online-intermediation-platforms-market-inquiry/ Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry]. This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt [https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CC_OIPMI-Summary-of-Findings-and-Remedial-action.pdf Food]. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent [https://www.bricscompetition.org/news/south-africas-regulator-published-its-final-report-on-online-intermediation-market-inquiry self-preferencing]. </p>
	~~<p><br>~~</p>
	<p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry.This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt Food. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent self-preferencing. </p>
	<p>'''African Union Protocol'''</p>		<p>'''African Union Protocol'''</p>
	<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>		<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>

JuliaGawłas: /* South Africa */

2025-11-19T10:31:41Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:31, 19 November 2025
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	Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.		Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.
	=== South Africa ===		=== South Africa ===
			<p>'''Competition Act'''</p>
			<p>When considering the regulation of platform power in South Africa, currently the only legally binding act applicable is the 1998 Competition Act. </p>
			<p>However, this Act has been criticized for not being sufficiently equipped to handle uncompetitive practices in the digital sphere, including the acts of powerful platforms. In applying the Act to these circumstances, there are various other shortcomings. For instance, it does not provide clear mandates and roles to statutory bodies, like the Competition Commission, to offer remedies to consumers who have been subject to vulnerabilities stemming from the acts of platforms and other actors in the digital space. To highlight the drawbacks of the Act in applying to platforms, algorithmic price discrimination can be taken as an example. At the time when the Act was passed, algorithmic price discrimination did not exist, explaining the lack of reference to it. The lack of such a reference perpetuates uncertainty as to how it should be regulated and tackled by competition authorities in South Africa. These uncertainties disturb the proper functioning of competition authorities in carrying out their functions in combating and dealing with any kind of uncompetitive conduct. </p>

			<p>'''Inquiries and Preliminary Report '''</p>
			<p>While the Competition Act may not explicitly refer to digital markets and powerful players on said markets, South African competition authorities alternatively rely on market inquiries to intervene in digital markets. Market inquiries are essentially studies of the state of the market, investigating various aspects such as ‘the general state of competition, the levels of concentration in and structure of a market for particular goods of services. The inquiries are referred to as being proactive as they seek to improve competition, instead of reacting and trying to address abusive conduct. The inquiries are concluded with a binding remedial action and recommendations to the government on any changes which should be adopted. These are considered effective as they produce ‘tangible solutions’ to address structural barriers, in comparison to targeted enforcement where only specific actions are being tackled. The inquiries find their legal basis in Chapter 4A of the Competition Act, setting out the procedures, timelines and responsibilities attached to them. Either the Competition Commission or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition can initiate an inquiry if there are suspicions of market distortion. Interestingly, there is a lower threshold for proving adverse effects on competition in comparison to other enforcement tools (which are effective for traditional competition issues). Inquires can consider public interest factors, for example requiring the Commission to assess how anti competitive effects can affect SMEs and businesses owned by historically disadvantaged persons (HDP). </p>
			<p><br></p>
			<p>The most prominent inquiry was back in 2023, known as the Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry.This inquiry was launched upon concerns that certain intermediation platforms impeded or restricted competition by limiting the participation of SMEs and HDP participation, aiming to assess the competition dynamics. The final report concluded that SME and HDP participation was significantly constrained by anti-competitive practices of large platforms. Some anticompetitive conducts included price parity clauses, self preferencing, and a lack of transparency in paid search. Binding remedial actions were imposed on various platforms, such as Google, Apple, Booking.com, Uber Eats and Bolt Food. For example Google has to add a South African badge and search filter to ease users in finding and supporting South African platforms. Furthermore, Google needs to provide training and 100 million Rand in advertising credits to smaller South African platforms. Additionally, Google is to implement the same changes it makes in Europe to prevent self-preferencing. </p>
	<p>'''African Union Protocol'''</p>		<p>'''African Union Protocol'''</p>
	<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>		<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>

NadineWalsh: /* South Africa */

2025-11-13T19:13:40Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:13, 13 November 2025
Line 295:		Line 295:
	Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.		Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.
	=== South Africa ===		=== South Africa ===
	<p>'''African Union Protocol'''</p><p>The~~</p>~~[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy]~~<p>~~was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p><p>The~~</p>~~[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf key aims of the protocol]~~<p>~~are to provide for an “integrated and unified African continental competition” and “manage the interrelationships of competition regimes and sectoral regulatory laws at the national, regional, and continental levels”. It borrows the terminology of ‘gatekeeper’ from DMA.</p>[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Part II of the Protocol]~~<p>~~outlines the anti-competitive business practices and conduct being “incompatible with the proper functioning of the Market”, such as collusion, abuse of a dominant position, mergers and acquisitions preventing market competition, price fixing, and bid-rigging among others.~~</p>~~<p>It is~~</p>~~[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf prohibited for an undertaking or a group of undertakings or gatekeepers]~~<p>~~to abuse the relative position of economic dependence over a customer or supplier if the conduct substantially affects the functioning and structure of competition in the market.</p><p>The~~</p>~~[https://static.pmg.org.za/250903_Ratification_AfCFTA_Protocols.pdf latest status on the ratification process of the protocol]~~<p>~~at the time of writing, was that it has not yet been signed by the required 23 or more member states and is therefore not yet in force.</p>		<p>'''African Union Protocol'''</p>
			<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy] was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p>
			<p>The [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf key aims of the protocol] are to provide for an “integrated and unified African continental competition” and “manage the interrelationships of competition regimes and sectoral regulatory laws at the national, regional, and continental levels”. It borrows the terminology of ‘gatekeeper’ from DMA.</p>
			[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Part II of the Protocol] outlines the anti-competitive business practices and conduct being “incompatible with the proper functioning of the Market”, such as collusion, abuse of a dominant position, mergers and acquisitions preventing market competition, price fixing, and bid-rigging among others.<p>It is [https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf prohibited for an undertaking or a group of undertakings or gatekeepers] to abuse the relative position of economic dependence over a customer or supplier if the conduct substantially affects the functioning and structure of competition in the market.</p>
			<p>The [https://static.pmg.org.za/250903_Ratification_AfCFTA_Protocols.pdf latest status on the ratification process of the protocol] at the time of writing, was that it has not yet been signed by the required 23 or more member states and is therefore not yet in force.</p>

	==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====		==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====
	<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p>		<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p>

NadineWalsh: /* South Africa */

2025-11-13T19:11:23Z

South Africa

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:11, 13 November 2025
Line 295:		Line 295:
	Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.		Of course, the approaches of some of these Bills are more radical than others on their impacts on big tech firms. None of these bills have been passed and it is now unpredictable to determine which will pass in the wake of [https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-republicans-win-control-us-senate-make-gains-house-2024-11-06/ Trump’s 2024 election win], and the Republican control more generally over numerous federal institutions. Additionally, big tech Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have been reported [https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/27/politics/big-tech-ceos-donald-trump-election/index.html sidling up to Trump], with Elon Musk’s endorsement the strongest, possibly hoping for Trump to [https://www.wired.com/story/dial-up-jared-clemons/ extend tax cuts] to big corporations implemented during his first term.
	=== South Africa ===		=== South Africa ===
			<p>'''African Union Protocol'''</p><p>The</p>[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on Competition Policy]<p>was agreed by the African Union in 2023. </p><p>The</p>[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf key aims of the protocol]<p>are to provide for an “integrated and unified African continental competition” and “manage the interrelationships of competition regimes and sectoral regulatory laws at the national, regional, and continental levels”. It borrows the terminology of ‘gatekeeper’ from DMA.</p>[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf Part II of the Protocol]<p>outlines the anti-competitive business practices and conduct being “incompatible with the proper functioning of the Market”, such as collusion, abuse of a dominant position, mergers and acquisitions preventing market competition, price fixing, and bid-rigging among others.</p><p>It is</p>[https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/45080-treaty-EN_AfCFTA_Protocol_on_Competition_Policy.pdf prohibited for an undertaking or a group of undertakings or gatekeepers]<p>to abuse the relative position of economic dependence over a customer or supplier if the conduct substantially affects the functioning and structure of competition in the market.</p><p>The</p>[https://static.pmg.org.za/250903_Ratification_AfCFTA_Protocols.pdf latest status on the ratification process of the protocol]<p>at the time of writing, was that it has not yet been signed by the required 23 or more member states and is therefore not yet in force.</p>
	==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====		==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====
	<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p>		<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p>

NadineWalsh: /* Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness */

2025-11-13T19:10:57Z

Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:10, 13 November 2025
Line 296:		Line 296:
	=== South Africa ===		=== South Africa ===
	==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====		==== '''Comparison with EU legislation and Appropriateness''' ====
	<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p><p>Bauer and Pandya argue however that the adoption of the essence of foreign regulations, namely the EU’s DMAt is a marked shift away from the “~~</p>~~[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. principles of traditional competition regulation]~~<p>~~”. </p><p>A criticism of the market inquiry approach is the identification of market leaders as competitive distortion. What is missing however to substantiate this claim, are the formal findings of dominance. Where the~~</p>~~[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng DMA outlines prerequisites]~~<p>~~to be established as dominant (i.e. annual turnover, market capitalisation, active (business) users), this is absent in the inquiry. </p><p>A further criticism of relying on the EU regulation or any other as they were, is a way to regulate for “~~</p>~~[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits]~~<p>~~”. </p><p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which~~</p>~~[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ]~~<p>~~describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>		<p>In line with Anu Bradford’s claim that the “EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”, the influence of European legislation on South Africa and the wider continent is apparent and the Brussels Effect seems to be in full swing.</p>
			<p>Bauer and Pandya argue however that the adoption of the essence of foreign regulations, namely the EU’s DMAt is a marked shift away from the “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. principles of traditional competition regulation]”. </p>
			<p>A criticism of the market inquiry approach is the identification of market leaders as competitive distortion. What is missing however to substantiate this claim, are the formal findings of dominance. Where the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng DMA outlines prerequisites] to be established as dominant (i.e. annual turnover, market capitalisation, active (business) users), this is absent in the inquiry. </p>
			<p>A further criticism of relying on the EU regulation or any other as they were, is a way to regulate for “[https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. hypothetical risks while ignoring tangible consumer benefits]”. </p>
			<p>Where the inquiry leaves the alignment with the DMA behind is its proposed interventions, which [https://africanantitrust.com/2025/05/02/borrowed-blueprints-unintended-consequences-south-africa-and-the-eus-digital-markets-act/#:~:text=For%20search%20results%2C%20Google%20is%20required%20to,in%20travel%2Drelated%20searches%20entirely%20free%20of%20charge. Bauer and Pandya ] describe as “heavy-handed”. The interventions can potentially more closely be described as “market engineering”, with suggestions of providing free advertising space to rivals, artificially boosting local competitors in search rankings and subsidising rivals.</p>

	==== '''Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa''' ====		==== '''Outlook, recommendations, and how to get it right for South Africa''' ====
	<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>		<p>In a parallel evaluation of how South Africa is adapting to rising pressures from digital platforms on an increasingly competitive market and the need for a “robust regulatory response”,</p>