Social-Media Governance in the EU - by Sergey Abramov

Social-Media Governance in the EU

Social-media platforms in the European Union are governed through overlapping public and private institutions. Four institutions illustrate the resulting distribution of authority and its limitations.

The European Commission, a public institution, derives its supervisory authority from the Digital Services Act (DSA) article 56(2)-(3). Its governing instruments include binding enforcement decisions and fines under articles 73-74. It exclusively supervises the additional obligations imposed on designated very large platforms, including systemic-risk assessment and mitigation under articles 34-35. These obligations protect fundamental rights, public safety and democratic processes. Its capacity weakness is informational dependence: assessing algorithmic risks requires substantial technical knowledge held by regulated companies. [1]

The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) is a public institution designated as the Dutch Digital Services Coordinator under DSA article 49 and Dutch implementing legislation. Its instruments include investigations, compliance orders and fines under article 51, alongside complaint handling under article 53. It protects users’ rights, particularly fair moderation procedures and children’s safety. Its capacity limitation is cross-border dependence: under article 56, supervision generally follows the provider’s main establishment, subject to the Commission’s powers. ACM therefore often depends on other authorities to address Dutch users’ complaints, illustrating Black’s account of regulatory interdependence. [2]

Meta, a non-state corporate institution operating Facebook and Instagram, derives governing authority from user contracts and control over platform infrastructure. Its instruments are terms of service, Community Standards and moderation decisions. It claims to protect safety while enabling expression. DSA article 14(1) and (4) requires transparent rules and proportionate enforcement attentive to fundamental rights; it constrains rather than creates Meta’s private authority. [3] Its legitimacy weakness is that users have limited influence over rules governing their participation. 

Appeals Centre Europe, a non-state dispute-resolution body, derives its recognised role from certification by Ireland’s Coimisiún na Meán under DSA article 21(3). Its instruments are procedural rules and decisions reviewing platform moderation. It seeks to protect fair treatment and access to redress. Its principal capacity weakness is explicit in article 21(2): decisions are non-binding, although platforms must engage in good faith. Independent review therefore does not guarantee implementation. [4]

These arrangements reflect Lobel’s view of governance through cooperation between public and private actors. [5] Yet shared responsibility does not guarantee equal influence or accountability. Effective governance requires users to understand decisions, challenge them and obtain meaningful remedies. The DSA supports these goals, but their achievement depends on effective oversight and enforcement.

Footnotes

1. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) [2022] OJ L277/1 (‘DSA’), arts 34–35, 56(2)–(3), 67 and 73-74 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng> accessed 22 September 2026.
2. DSA (n 2), arts 49, 51, 53 and 56; Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, Digital Services Act: Annual Activity Report 2025 (2026) sections 1.1-1.2 and 2.2 <https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-2025-dsa-annual-report> accessed 22 September 2026; Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 109-12 <https://doi.org/10.1093/clp/54.1.103> accessed 22 September 2026).
3. DSA (n 2), art 14(1) and (4); Meta, ‘Safety Policies’ <https://www.meta.com/en-gb/safety/topics/safety-basics/policies/> accessed 22 September 2026.
4. DSA (n 2), art 21(2)-(3); Coimisiún na Meán, Information Note re the Decision to Certify the Appeals Centre Europe as an Out-of-Court Dispute Settlement Body pursuant to Article 21 of the Digital Services Act (May 2025) 3-8 <https://www.cnam.ie/app/uploads/2025/05/ACE-Info-Note-final-version-English-for-website.pdf> accessed 22 September 2026; European Commission, ‘Out-of-Court Dispute Settlement Bodies under the Digital Services Act (DSA)’ (11 September 2026) <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-out-court-dispute-settlement> accessed 22 September 2026.
5. Orly Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342, introduction and pt III <https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/663/> accessed 22 September 2026.

Comment from Sebastián: excelent work Sergey! I would only add that user engagement is one of Meta's greatest interests behind its governance efforts, despite it not being properly disclosed.

Comment from Bodo: this is an excellent overview of the formal institutions. How would media reporting, pressure from NGOs, activists, and politicians fit into this picture?